Patent Abolitionism by Janis, Mark D.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2002
Patent Abolitionism
Mark D. Janis
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, mdjanis@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Janis, Mark D., "Patent Abolitionism" (2002). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 431.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/431

3$7(17$%2/,7,21,60
%\0DUN’-DQLV
$%675$&7
In this Article, Professor Janis argues that modern enthusiasm for 
large-scale legislative reforms in patent law should be received with 
caution in view of the history of patent law reform. That history suggests 
that patent law is more resilient—or perhaps more impervious to 
change—than modern reformers recognize. To explore these proposi-
tions, Professor Janis analyzes the history of the mid-Victorian era Brit-
ish patent abolitionism movement. He demonstrates that much of the re-
form dialogue of that era, from the elucidation of major problems in the 
patent system, to the formulation of legislative solutions, mirrors quite 
closely the modern U.S. patent reform debate. He asserts that participants 
in the modern patent law reform debate should take this history to heart, 
approaching age-old proposals for large-scale legislative reform with 
healthy skepticism. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Patent reform . . . was unimportant, esoteric and dull. It was a 
subject for the hard-headed enthusiast, and demanded unfaltering 
attention rather than sparkling rhetoric.1 
 “Esoteric?” Undoubtedly. “Dull?” No comment. But, “unimportant?” 
Not! Today, everyone wants to be a patent law reformer. I give you Be-
zos.2 Nader.3 Gore.4 Oprah.5 
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 †  Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. Thanks to Mark Lemley 
and the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, and to Dan Burk, Justin Hughes, and 
Rob Merges for helpful comments. Rob Hodgson and Gary Quick provided excellent 
research assistance. 
 1. H.I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE IN-
DUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750-1852, at 57 (1984) (describing mid-nineteenth century Brit-
ish patent law reform). 
         2. See, e.g., Scott Thurm, Amazon.com Chief Executive Urges Shorter Duration for 
Internet Patents, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2000, at B3 (reporting on Bezos’ suggestions in 
his open letter on the Amazon.com website, which advocated term reduction for software 
patents, pre-grant oppositions, and other reforms). 
        3.  See, e.g., Consumer Project on Technology, at http://www.cptech.org/ (last vis-
ited Jan.9, 2002). 
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Alas for Bezos and his fellow luminaries—patent law reform remains 
a subject for hard-headed enthusiasts. Patent law has a long and complex 
history. Even patent law reform has a long history, and modern patent law 
reform efforts can benefit by taking careful account of that history. This 
Article examines one curious historical episode—the short-lived move-
ment for patent abolition—and analyzes whether the history of this most 
radical of reforms can teach us anything about more temperate reforms of 
the modern patent system.  
Nowadays, it is hard to find any rock-ribbed, dyed-in-the-wool patent 
abolitionists. Indeed, it is hard to find any patent abolitionists at all. 
Contemporary patent policy debates seem invariably to start from the 
premise that the patent system is a fait accompli.6 Even Fritz Machlup, 
who declared that he could not justify instituting a new patent system on 
economic grounds, allowed grudgingly that he would consider it 
irresponsible to abolish patent systems that had long existed.7 Likewise, 
scholars such as Shavell and Van Ypersele, who have studied the 
economics of reward systems, tend to offer them as adjuncts to, not 
replacements for, the patent system.8 
In truth, there never were very many patent abolitionists. In the United 
States, no substantial patent abolitionist movement has ever emerged, al-
though there were some late-nineteenth century commentators who 
warned that “the people might rise in their wrath” against the patent sys-
                                                                                                                         
        4.  Meaning Al. See Douglas Kiker, Gore Proposes Generic Drug Plan, AP 
ONLINE, Nov. 8, 1999, available at 1999 WL 28136946 (reporting that at a campaign 
stop at a pharmacy, candidate Gore remarked that “[p]atents are great” but that “unfair 
patent extensions” resulted in higher consumer prices for pharmaceuticals, a problem that 
should be addressed by new legislation). For patent issues concerning the other Gore, see 
W.L. Gore & Associates v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983), addressing 
patents relating to Gore-Tex technology.  
         5. Actually, I’m not entirely sure about Oprah. 
 6. For a rare counterexample, see Brian Peckham, Should the U.S. Patent Laws Be 
Abolished?, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 389 (1985) (analyzing seriously, but largely rejecting, 
abolitionist arguments). 
 7. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
(Comm. Print 1958) (Fritz Machlup, author). Machlup asserted that: 
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the ba-
sis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recom-
mend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long 
time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, 
to recommend abolishing it. 
Id. at 80. 
 8. See generally Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellec-
tual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001). 
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tem,9 others who feared imminent Congressional action,10 and still others 
who thought that the Supreme Court was poised to take care of the job 
through “judicial legislation.”11 As experience has demonstrated, reports 
of the death of the U.S. patent system have always been greatly exagger-
ated. Even claims that the system is in mortal “distress” seem quaint in the 
current environment.12  
Victorian England, however, did have patent abolitionists, and they cut 
a wide swath. The movement, however, was short lived. Serious debate 
over whether to abolish the British patent system extended for several 
years in the mid-nineteenth century. The British patent system emerged 
from this ordeal unchanged in some respects and fundamentally modern-
ized in others. 
This Article explores the relevance to modern U.S. patent law of the 
nineteenth century patent abolitionism movement in England. This con-
nection is significant, although it may not immediately be apparent due to 
material differences between the British patent system of the early and 
middle nineteenth century—the “unreformed” patent system13—and the 
                                                                                                                         
 9. D.J. Brewer, The Patent System, 3 YALE L.J. 149, 157 (1894) (expressing “the 
strong conviction that unless some radical changes are made in the patent system as it 
exists to-day it will not be many years before the people rise in their wrath and abolish it 
altogether.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Chauncey Smith, A Century of Patent Law, 5 Q. J. ECON. 44 (Oct. 
1890). Smith states: 
It is undeniable that there has been, and doubtless still is in some parts 
of the country, a wide-spread hostility to the patent law. . . . The writer 
was assured several years ago . . . that a large number of the members 
of the House of Representatives were ready at any moment to vote for 
the repeal of the patent law. At every session of Congress bills are in-
troduced, providing, if not for the repeal of the law, at least for its 
amendment in such a way as to destroy or impair the value of patent 
property. 
Id. at 58-59. 
 11. Avery v. Ever Ready Label Corp., 104 F. Supp. 913, 914 (D.N.J. 1952) (report-
ing the views of some observers that the Supreme Court, in the course of its mid-
twentieth century patent jurisprudence, “has deviated from well-established doctrines of 
patent law and may soon abolish the patent system by judicial legislation”). 
 12. See Abe Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 810 
(1971); see also Mark D. Janis, The Revival of Distress in the Patent System (forthcoming 
2002) (on file with author) (positing that the patent system endures cycles of under pro-
tection and overprotection, and accompanying cycles of distress and exuberance); cf. 
Lawrence G. Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent System, 73 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5 (1991). 
 13. KLAUS BOEHM, I THE BRITISH PATENT SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATION 19-26 (1967) 
(referring to the “unreformed patent system” as subsisting until the passage of the 1852 
Patents Act, or roughly between 1750 and 1850). Relevant statutes during this period 
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modern U.S. system. The British patent system of the time was a registra-
tion system.14 Until 1852, the system lacked any central granting author-
ity,15 and even afterward, the Patent Office conducted no substantive pat-
entability examination until reforms were enacted in the 1880’s. Patent 
applicants were subject to pre-grant oppositions,16 and prior to 1852, pre-
viously-filed caveats as well.17  
                                                                                                                         
include patents acts of 1835, 1839, and 1852. See Patents Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 83 
(Eng.); Patents Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 67 (Eng.); Patents Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., c. 
83 (Eng.), reprinted in JOHN CORYTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LETTERS-PATENT, 
FOR THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRE-
LAND 275, 279, 294 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1855) (reproducing the text of the 
1835, 1839, and 1852 Acts). 
  For a study of the origins of the British patent system and its history through the 
eighteenth century, see generally CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM 1660-1800 (1988). 
 14. That is, the system included no provisions for substantive pre-grant examination. 
By contrast, after a relatively brief experiment with a patent registration system, the U.S. 
abandoned it in 1836 in favor of pre-grant examination. See generally EDWARD C. WAL-
TERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND 
ADMINISTRATION 1798-1836 (1998). 
  One key point in debates over reform of the British patent system in 1850-51 
was whether to institute pre-grant examination. Thomas Webster, one of the proponents 
of this position, pointed with approval to the U.S. system in arguing for pre-grant 
examination. See MOUREEN COULTER, PROPERTY IN IDEAS: THE PATENT QUESTION IN 
MID-VICTORIAN BRITAIN 57 (1991). It is remarkable that even as early as the mid-
nineteenth century, U.S. patent law was beginning to influence the course of British 
patent law, even though U.S. patent law had come into formal existence only a few 
decades before, borrowing from British law and antecedents. 
  For more on Thomas Webster’s positions in the patent reform and abolition de-
bate, see infra Part II. 
 15. Instead, applicants were required to negotiate an almost impossibly complicated 
journey through multiple government offices. See infra notes 24-45 and accompanying 
text. 
 16. See W.M. HINDMARCH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO PATENT PRIVI-
LEGES FOR THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS 377 (London, V. & R. Stevens 1846) (describ-
ing the relatively restrictive pre-1852 opposition practice); THOMAS WEBSTER, THE NEW 
PATENT LAW: ITS HISTORY, OBJECTS, AND PROVISIONS 25-26 (4th ed. 1854), micro-
formed on 19th-Century Legal Treatises, Fiche 39,017 (Research Publications Int’l) (de-
scribing 1852 Act provisions authorizing “advertisement” of specifications and providing 
an opportunity for pre-grant opposition by interested members of the public); see also id. 
at 8 (explaining that the 1852 Act also incorporated a notion of provisional rights “thus 
affording a precedent for the principle that the legal right should date from the day of the 
application, unless justice to other parties required that it should be post-dated”). 
 17. HINDMARCH, supra note 16, at 504-05 (explaining that a caveat was a filing ex-
pressing an inventor’s intent later to file a patent application and petitioning that no pat-
ent be granted on the invention without notice to the caveat filer); see also WEBSTER, 
 3$7(17$%2/,7,21,60  
 
Not surprisingly, British patents of the time afforded relatively inse-
cure rights.18 In addition to being subject to invalidity defenses in in-
fringement actions,19 British patentees could be made defendants in scire 
facias actions, a remedy for the public and the Crown against defective 
patents.20 Moreover, prior to 1852, British patentees could obtain an in-
junction against patent infringement only via a separate action at equity in 
the Chancery Court, and the Court ordinarily required that infringement of 
valid rights be established in a prior proceeding at the law courts.21 Sur-
prisingly, despite these important differences, much of the core agenda 
that motivated nineteenth century British patent law reform and abolition-
ist movements has carried over to U.S. patent law reform agendas of both 
the twentieth and, now, the twenty-first centuries. Patent abolitionism may 
help give historical context for current patent reform efforts. It may also 
yield lessons about the process of patent law reform, and, more generally, 
about the political economy of patent systems old and new. 
Part II considers reform initiatives in early nineteenth century British 
patent law that preceded the mid-Victorian abolitionist movement. Part III 
turns to the abolitionist movement itself, focusing on several aspects of 
that movement that are pertinent to modern patent reform discussions. Part 
IV offers some conclusions about the process of patent law reform, includ-
ing a cautionary observation about the absence of evolution in patent re-
form agendas over the past century. 
                                                                                                                         
supra note 16, at 25 (noting with approval that the 1852 Act abolished the caveat prac-
tice). 
 18. Those rights included basic exclusive rights in making, using, and selling the 
patented invention for a 14-year term measured from the date of sealing. HINDMARCH, 
supra note 16, at 53-55 (exclusive rights); id. at 144 (term). 
 19. Id. at 262. 
 20. Id. at 376-430 (describing scire facias actions in detail). Scire facias actions 
might be likened to declaratory judgment actions in form, but scire facias actions were 
not constrained by jurisdictional limitations that characterize modern declaratory judg-
ment actions. Accordingly, they could readily be used to harass patentees. In response, a 
“Patentees’ Association” formed in the late 1700’s to resist “opulent manufacturers” who 
“have agreed to use very beneficial patent inventions [without authorization] and have 
subscribed large sums to attack the same by writ of Scire facias.” DUTTON, supra note 1, 
at 37 (citing an anonymous circular found in the correspondence of James Watt). Evi-
dently, James Watt was unimpressed with this early version of a patent owners’ lobby, 
calling the Patentees’ Association a motley crew of “projectors and madmen, some of 
which I thought it a disgrace to keep company.” See id.  
 21. For a description of the 1852 reform of this practice, see WEBSTER, supra note 
16, at 36 (explaining that section 42 of the 1852 Act gave courts at common law the 
power to grant injunctions and an accounting in the case of infringement). 
 %(5.(/(<7(&+12/2*</$:-2851$/ 

II. PRECURSORS TO ABOLITIONISM:  ADMINISTRATIVE 
REFORM AND THE “HEROIC INVENTOR” MOTIF 
A. The Letters of “Vindicator” 
Beginning in 1828, the London Journal of Arts and Sciences published 
a series of letters whose author, in the style of the times, identified himself 
by a pseudonym, “Vindicator.” Vindicator took on the British patent ad-
ministration, which he excoriated, in characteristically unsparing rhetoric, 
as a system of “rank absurdity, oppression, and humbug.”22 Vindicator 
portrayed the formal prerequisites for obtaining patent protection and the 
fees accompanying each step in excruciating detail. According to Vindica-
tor, the procedures amounted to a “heterogeneous mass of antiquated pre-
tensions—of fantastic operations—of absurd practices—and of legal im-
positions,” which were “retained for the sole advantage of a few State of-
ficers and subalterns, in defiance of common sense, of common honesty, 
and of the universal feeling of society.”23  
Vindicator’s portrayal was not far off the mark. British patent admini-
stration in the first half of the nineteenth century was truly Byzantine. 
Hindmarch, a barrister and patent treatise author,24 described the proce-
dures in a single sentence of alarming proportions: 
 [A] petition for the patent, verified by a solemn declaration, and 
left at the Home Office; a reference of the petition by the Secre-
tary of State to the Attorney or Solicitor General; a report by one 
of those officers to the Crown in favour of the grant; a warrant 
under the sign manual to the Attorney or Solicitor General to 
prepare a bill for the patent; the preparation of the bill and two 
                                                                                                                         
 22. Letter XIII, On the Chancery Fees and Charges upon Patents for Inventions, 3 
LONDON J. ARTS & SCI. 1-8 (1829), reprinted in JEREMY PHILLIPS, CHARLES DICKENS 
AND THE ‘POOR MAN’S TALE OF A PATENT’ app. D, at 47 (1984). Phillips speculates that 
Vindicator was probably William Newton, editor of the London Journal of Arts & Sci-
ences and a leading expert on the British patent system. Id. at 9. 
  By no means was Vindicator the first agitator for patent law reform in the Brit-
ish patent system. For example, in the late eighteenth century, preeminent inventor James 
Watt made a variety of proposals for refinements to the patent law. See Eric Robinson, 
James Watt and the Law of Patents, 13 TECH. & CULTURE 115 (1972); see also BOEHM, 
supra note 13, at 26-27 (remarking on Watt’s activities and noting that patent reform bills 
were introduced, without success, in 1793, 1819-1822, 1826, and 1833); DUTTON, supra 
note 1, at 39-40 (discussing Watt’s proposals to maintain specifications in secrecy and to 
have them examined to ensure that they were sufficiently comprehensible). 
 23. Letter XVI, On the Fees and Charges upon Chancery Patents for Inventions, 3 
LONDON J. ARTS & SCI. 175-80 (1829), reprinted in JEREMY PHILLIPS, CHARLES DICK-
ENS AND THE ‘POOR MAN’S TALE OF A PATENT’ app. D, at 51 (1984). 
 24. See HINDMARCH, supra note 16. 
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transcripts or copies of it in the Attorney General’s Office, called 
the Patent Bill Office; the conversion of one of these copies of 
the bill into the Queen’s Bill, upon its receiving the sign manual; 
the first bill being deposited in the Signet Office, a second copy 
is transformed into the Signet Bill by adding a few formal words 
to it, and sealing it with the seal of the Secretary of State; the 
Signet Bill being received in the Privy Seal Office, the remaining 
copy of the bill is in a similar manner converted into the Privy 
Seal Bill; the Privy Seal Bill is then delivered to the Lord Chan-
cellor, and a patent made in the form contained in the bill.25 
Effectively, the patent applicant had to set in motion a chain of com-
mand that commenced with the Queen and proceeded through a wilder-
ness of bureaucracy. While this may appear to modern sensibilities as an 
early example of bureaucracies expanding to fill every void, Hindmarch 
suggested that this “cumbrous machinery” was probably the product of 
deliberate policy tracing back to the sixteenth century.26 During the reign 
of Henry VIII, it was considered important to limit the power to confer 
valuable grants in any individual officer of the Crown. Coke had explained 
as much in his “Institutes:” 
 [S]uch was the wisdom of prudent antiquity, that whatsoever 
should passe the Great Seale should come through so many 
hands, to the end that nothing should passe that Great Seale, that 
is so highly esteemed and accounted of in law, that as against 
law or inconvenient; or that anything should passe from the king 
anywayes, which he intended not, by undue or surreptitious 
meanes.27 
Even applicants who succeeded in navigating this formidable bureau-
cratic maze attained patent protection of dubious value, at best, because at 
no stage in these extraordinarily cumbersome procedures did British pat-
ent authorities ever conduct a substantive examination of patentability.28 
In addition to being subjected to potential pre-grant oppositions, an inven-
tor might have his granted patent attacked in the courts on a writ of scire 
                                                                                                                         
 25. W.M. HINDMARCH, OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEFECTS OF THE PATENT LAWS OF 
THIS COUNTRY; WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR THE REFORM OF THEM 2 (Philadelphia, T. & 
J.W. Johnson 1851). 
 26. Id. at 4. 
       27. Id. (quoting EDWARD COKE, 2 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 555 (Lon-
don, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (Articuli super chartas)). The policy, as relevant to the 
patent grant, was embodied in a statute popularly known as the 1536 Clerks Act, 27 Hen. 
VIII. c. 11 (1535). 
 28. See supra note 14.  
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facias, or by invalidity challenges offered as defenses in infringement pro-
ceedings.29 
Vindicator had put out a call for dramatic reform. Asserting that 
“[m]en of skill, intellect, sense, learning, and nerve, are in decided opposi-
tion to all attempts to bolster up this most rotten part of a decaying order 
of things,” he urged “public meetings, to petition Parliament for an effec-
tual revision of patent laws and practice, and the adoption of an entire new 
system of protection to inventions.”30  
Vindicator enjoyed partial vindication, eventually. In 1829, Parliament 
appointed a Select Committee of the House of Commons to review the 
patent system,31 eventually leading to the passage of the 1835 Patents 
Act32—by all accounts a “timid measure” making no major reforms.33 In 
1851, Hindmarch’s work identified many of the same defects about which 
Vindicator had so vociferously complained:  bewildering and burdensome 
procedures, delay, and stifling costs.34 Not until the 1852 Act did Britain 
finally discard its archaic procedures and reduce application filing costs.35 
But even the 1852 Act left much to be accomplished.36 
The complaints of early British patent reformers demonstrate that dis-
satisfaction with patent administration—patent acquisition procedures, 
                                                                                                                         
 29. See HINDMARCH, supra note 16, at 376-431 (explaining the scire facias action 
and pre-grant opposition practice under nineteenth century British practice). 
 30. Letter XIII, supra note 22, at 47. 
 31. COULTER, supra note 14, at 44 (referring to the 1829 Committee). 
 32. Patents Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 83 (Eng.). 
 33. BOEHM, supra note 13, at 27; see also WEBSTER, supra note 16, at 3. 
 34. As to the last, see HINDMARCH, supra note 25, at 11, which claims that “[t]he 
enormous sums which inventors must pay to obtain patents for their inventions, form one 
of the greatest grievances of which they have to complain.” Hindmarch called for a series 
of reforms ranging from the inclusion of foreign publications as prior art, to granting 
third parties the right to a hearing in pre-grant oppositions, to requiring a printed specifi-
cation and “some clear or distinct claim or claims of invention,” to, perhaps most impor-
tantly, that “[a]ll the present preliminary proceedings for obtaining patents to be abol-
ished.” See id. at 54-57. 
 35. BOEHM, supra note 13, at 28-29 (reducing the filing fee to 25 pounds, compared 
to the 300 pounds that Old John would have paid for comparable U.K. protection). 
 36. The 1852 Act did not institute substantive pre-grant examination, and despite 
centralizing patent operations in a Patent Office, apparently did not provide adequate 
administrative oversight, as made evident when large amounts of Patent Office funds 
were unaccounted for in 1864. Id.; see also WEBSTER, supra note 16, at 42-48 (detailing 
numerous shortcomings remaining in the 1852 Act). 
  On the other hand, the “cardinal features” of the 1852 Act included: (1) protec-
tion from the day of application; (2) one patent for the United Kingdom; (3) moderate 
cost; (4) printing and publication of specifications; and (5) one office of patents and 
specifications. Id. at 41.  
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fees,37 and the extent of public participation in the process38—is by no 
means a new theme in patent reform debates. This alone should serve as a 
sobering reminder to students of twenty-first century patent policy that 
much of what we say about reforming patent administration has probably 
been said before, and many of the solutions that we propose have been 
proposed, and probably previously discarded, though the social, economic, 
and legal contexts have varied. 
The tepid legislative response that greeted early nineteenth century 
British patent reform efforts may also provide an important lesson about 
the patent reform process in general. One might infer that then, as now, 
abstract expressions of moral umbrage over the arcana of patent 
administration are not likely to arouse the sympathies of politicians—at 
least, not very quickly. Eventually, however, patent reform, and even 
patent abolition, did gain a foothold in the British legislative agenda.  
B.  Origins of the “Heroic Inventor” Motif 
One important reason why British legislators ultimately took interest 
in patent reform is the emergence of what might be designated the “heroic 
inventor” motif. Charles Dickens was one of its chief progenitors. In 1850, 
Dickens published a short work entitled A Poor Man’s Tale of a Patent.39 
A Poor Man’s Tale is a narrative in the first person, told by the fictional 
“Old John.” By his own modest representation, Old John was a man “of an 
ingenious turn.”40 He spins a classic tale of invention:  
I have been twenty year, off and on, completing an Invention, 
and perfecting it. I perfected of it, last Christmas Eve at ten 
o’clock at night. Me and my wife stood and let some tears fall 
over the Model, when it was done and I brought her in to take a 
                                                                                                                         
 37. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., PATENT OFFICE FEES—A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1-3 (Comm. Print 1958) (Victor L. Edwards, author) (describing 
the fee structure under the patent acts of 1790, 1793, 1836, 1861, and recommendations 
in 1912); id. at 3-8 (describing the fee changes in 1922, 1927, and 1930); id. at 8-16 (de-
scribing various attempts to change fees from 1947 through 1957). 
  For more recent sample commentary, see Michael N. Meller, Planning for a 
Global Patent System, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 379, 380 (1998), and Erwin 
F. Berrier, Jr., Global Patent Costs Must Be Reduced, 36 IDEA 473 (1996). 
 38. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Adminis-
trative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1997) (com-
menting on newer proposals and tracing the history of legislative efforts to enact post-
grant revocation procedures). 
 39. See PHILLIPS, supra note 22, at 15-21 (full reprint of Dickens’ work). 
 40. Old John remarks that he hopes “[i]t won’t be took as boastful in me, if I make 
the remark . . . that I have always been of an ingenious turn.” Id. at 16. 
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look at it. . . .There it was, perfected of, on Christmas Eve. . . at 
ten o’clock at night. All the money I could spare I had laid out 
upon the Model; and when times was bad, or my daughter Char-
lotte’s children sickly, or both, it had stood still, months at a 
spell. I had pulled it to pieces, and made it over again with im-
provements, I don’t know how often. There it stood, at last, a 
perfected Model as aforesaid.41 
Old John’s troubles begin when he resolves to seek patent protection 
for his invention. Drawing on his savings,42 Old John takes lodgings with 
Thomas Joy, an acquaintance in London, and proceeds on an epic journey 
through the British patent administration. In one memorable passage, he 
summarizes his odyssey in tones reminiscent of Vindicator: 
Look at the Home Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Patent 
Office, the Engrossing Clerk, the Lord Chancellor, the Privy 
Seal, the Clerk of the Patents, the Lord Chancellor’s Purse-
bearer, the Clerk of the Hanaper, the Deputy Clerk of the Hana-
per, the Deputy Sealer, and the Deputy Chaff-Wax. No man in 
England could get a Patent for an Indian-rubber band, or an iron-
hoop, without feeing all of them. Some of them, over and over 
again. I went through thirty-five stages. I began with the Queen 
upon the Throne. I ended with the Deputy Chaff-wax.43 
Old John ultimately succeeds in receiving his patent, but only after ex-
hausting nearly all of his savings.44 Obviously, Dickens’ Poor Man’s Tale 
is a direct, satirical commentary on the complexity and cost of the patent-
granting procedures under pre-1852 British practices. Reforms under the 
1852 Act followed shortly on the heels of the publication of the Poor 
Man’s Tale,45 and it is safe to assume that Dickens’ work had some small 
influence.  
For modern U.S. patent reform discussions, however, Dickens’ work 
may be of interest for quite different reasons. A Poor Man’s Tale is one of 
                                                                                                                         
 41. Id. at 16-17. 
 42. Specifically, his “legacy of one hundred and twenty-eight pound ten.” PHILLIPS, 
supra note 22, at 17. Says Old John, “[m]e and my wife never broke into that money yet. 
Note. We might come to be old and past our work. We now agreed . . . to make a hole in 
it—I mean in the aforesaid money—and Patent the invention.” Id. 
 43. PHILLIPS, supra note 22, at 20-21. Phillips speculates that Dickens may have 
been influenced, at least indirectly, by the Vindicator letters. Id. at 8-9. 
 44. “I was quite wore out, patience and pocket . . . I had lodged at Thomas Joy’s 
over six weeks, and the unopposed patent for my invention, for England only, had cost 
me ninety-six pound, seven, and eightpence. If I had taken it out for the United Kingdom, 
it would have cost me more than three hundred pound.” Id. at 19-20. 
 45. See generally WEBSTER, supra note 16 (explaining the reforms in the 1852 Act). 
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the earliest examples in Anglo-American patent law of invoking the now 
familiar motif of the heroic inventor. Dickens spends a good deal of A 
Poor Man’s Tale constructing a romantic image of the independent inven-
tor, from the tears over the prototype on Christmas Eve, to the plundering 
of the retirement savings to the persistence in the face of an unyielding 
bureaucracy. Towards the close of the Tale, Dickens makes a direct appeal 
to the inventor-as-hero, when Old John laments: 
Is it reasonable to make a man feel as if, in inventing an ingen-
ious improvement meant to do good, he had done something 
wrong? How else can a man feel, when he is met by such diffi-
culties at every turn? All inventors taking out a Patent MUST 
feel so . . . .46 
Although Dickens was peculiarly effective in idealizing inventors and 
the process of invention, he was not alone. Similar imagery appears else-
where in nineteenth century patent reform literature, albeit with less emo-
tional impact.47 
 
C. The “Heroic Inventor” in U.S. Patent Law Iconography 
The invocation of the heroic inventor in the cause of patent reform is 
intriguing because today, one hundred and fifty years later, the heroic in-
ventor remains firmly entrenched in the modern U.S. patent law iconogra-
                                                                                                                         
 46. PHILLIPS, supra note 22, at 20. 
 47. For example, in arguing against excessive filing fees in his 1851 volume on pat-
ent law reform, Hindmarch observes: 
This enormous cost of patents throws very many serious difficulties in 
the way of inventors. Such persons are seldom affluent, but on the con-
trary are generally in straitened circumstances, frequently very poor. 
Many intelligent workmen are possessed of very considerable inventive 
powers; but being unable to pay the cost of a patent for anything they 
may invent, they have no motive to turn aside out of the beaten track. 
HINDMARCH, supra note 25, at 12-13.  
  In tones that must surely resonate with contemporary high technology entrepre-
neurs, Hindmarch also gave an account of the perils of seeking venture capital financing:  
And if an artisan should seek the assistance of a capitalist to enable him 
to obtain the means of procuring a patent, he must disclose the inven-
tion to the man of whom he is in fact asking a favour, and thus put him-
self wholly in the power of the capitalist, who may dictate his owns 
terms respecting the assistance which he will afford, and the manner of 
doing it. In such cases poor inventors usually pay dearly for the assis-
tance that they obtain; and it frequently happens that they fail to obtain 
any profit from their inventions. 
Id. at 13. 
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phy. At first blush, this might seem counterintuitive in some respects. Af-
ter all, as Merges has written, the twentieth century witnessed a gradual 
“corporatization” of industrial research and development (“R&D”), and 
American patent law responded to this trend with the professionalization 
of the Patent Office,48 the liberalization of the rules for correcting inven-
torship, and the rejection of a doctrine that would have penalized patentees 
for failure to “work” patented technology.49 
In other respects, however, it makes sense that the heroic inventor mo-
tif has lingered in U.S. patent policy debates. First, it is conceivable that 
the corporatization of R&D has reinforced the romantic appeal of the lone 
inventor.50 Second, the heroic inventor motif, with its overtones of Jeffer-
sonian self-reliance and Yankee ingenuity, may simply mesh uniquely 
well with the American perception of its own identity.51 Third, the heroic 
inventor rhetoric can be used to render technical, arid patent reform de-
bates more accessible to nonspecialists. One might expect patent reformers 
to be drawn to the strategy of reconceptualizing the reform debate by at-
tempting to couple technical reform measures with the romantic imagery 
of the lone inventor struggling against a recalcitrant bureaucracy. 
The historical record of patent law reform yields a fair amount of an-
ecdotal evidence to support this last claim of rhetorical power, a power 
that endures over decades of American patent law reform. The U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) has done its share to contribute to this 
venerable literary tradition. A worthy exemplar appears on the PTO’s In-
dependent Inventor Resources website:  
                                                                                                                         
 48. Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law 
1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2216 (2000) (observing that corporate R&D de-
partments tended to file more patent applications, precipitating a need for administrative 
reform to enable the Patent Office to handle the heavy application volumes). 
 49. This occurred at the time that corporate entities were beginning to acquire patent 
protection for defensive purposes, and otherwise developing strategic patent portfolios. A 
requirement that patented technology be “worked” would have complicated, and might 
have thwarted, these efforts. Id. at 2219-21. 
 50. Perhaps the same phenomenon occurred in Dickens’ time. Nineteenth century 
observers experiencing the Industrial Revolution might surely have perceived that the day 
of the lone inventor—as embodied in the local craftsmen of the pastoral economy—was 
passing.  
 51. There is also some evidence that the independent inventor theme has played well 
outside the United States at various times. See, e.g., PETER MEINHARDT, INVENTIONS 
PATENTS AND MONOPOLY 237-244 (1946) (suggesting reform legislation for the British 
patent system that would provide various forms of assistance to “small” inventors); see 
also text accompanying notes 89-92 infra (discussing second tier patent regimes).  
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To paraphrase our Declaration of Independence, America is the 
land of the free, home of the brave, and haven for the independ-
ent inventor. Nowhere else in the world does a government exist 
that supports its independent inventors to the extent that we do. 
The independent inventor is America’s natural resource.52 
Another example comes from mid-1960’s symposium commentary 
from PTO officials in honor of the 175th anniversary of the U.S. Patent 
System. A symposium article published in the Journal of the Patent Office 
Society offered a poetic ode to the “Godly Inventor,” commencing, “A 
spark ignites your restless mind, a fearless soul, it starts to grind . . . .”53 
While scholars may be hard pressed to take seriously these grinding 
minds54 and revisions to basic American scripture,55 it seems significant 
that the PTO persists in its desire to offer homage to the heroic inventor. 
Whether purely the product of pragmatic considerations,56 or for purposes 
of political expediency, the heroic inventor and attendant symbolism lives 
on in American patent administration. 
The heroic inventor motif also manifests itself in judicial opinions. 
Patent litigators, present and past, undoubtedly would consider it glaringly 
obvious that the heroic inventor motif matters in patent litigation, the hero-
inventor being the quintessential protagonist in the patent infringement 
narrative. Writing in the mid-1950’s, Judge Rifkind captured this notion 
with Dickensian felicity: 
[I]n the eyes of the proponent of the patent, his client generally is 
the poor, famished, garret inventor pursuing for years his private 
faith in his particular vision of the new and useful; at the end of 
the first act he is the proud possessor of a diploma of achieve-
                                                                                                                         
 52. Independent Inventor Resources, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/-
iip/welcome.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2001) (displaying statement of Richard J. Apley, 
Director, USPTO Office of Independent Inventor Programs). 
  For earlier incarnations of PTO programs on behalf of independent inventors, 
see Isaac Fleischmann, The Patent Office and the Independent Inventor, 47 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 459 (1965), detailing mid-1960’s Patent Office efforts to assist independent inven-
tors, and Maurice A. Crews, Problems of the Independent Inventor, 41 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 159, 163 (1959), containing the Assistant Commissioner of Patents’ introduction 
of a pamphlet designed for independent inventors, and discussion of some “self-evident” 
problems faced by independent inventors who seek to use the patent system. 
 53. Fleischmann, supra note 52, at 465. 
 54. Or grinding souls, as it may be. 
 55. See generally PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARA-
TION OF INDEPENDENCE (1997) (saying nothing whatsoever about the “land of the free, 
home of the brave”). 
 56. For example, to reduce the costs associated with assisting pro se applicants. 
 %(5.(/(<7(&+12/2*</$:-2851$/ 

ment from the Patent Office; at the end of the second act, you 
find him complaining bitterly that a greedy corporation has kid-
napped his brain child and its inheritance.57 
This is not to suggest, however, that the heroic inventor motif in patent 
litigation is confined to relatively superficial appeals to emotion. For ex-
ample, Federal Circuit judges still periodically invoke the interests and 
imagery of the independent inventor in crafting and applying patent law 
rules.58 In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,59 Judge 
Linn argued that the Federal Circuit majority’s rule on prosecution history 
estoppel “wrongfully sets in place a regime that increases the cost and 
complexity of patent prosecution to the detriment of individual inventors. . 
.”
60
 and “discounts the intrinsic worth in treating more fairly the individual 
inventor whose patent right is under administrative scrutiny.”61 On occa-
                                                                                                                         
 57. Simon H. Rifkind, The Romance Discoverable in Patent Cases, 37 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 319, 322 (1955). Judge Rifkind also recorded his doubts that the romance of the 
hero-inventor motif had seeped into the general judicial consciousness: 
[T]he same judges write both patent opinions and admiralty opinions. 
But the lay reader would never guess that fact. No sooner does a judge 
betake himself to an admiralty case, but he immediately fancies himself 
a latter day Conrad. His manuscript is redolent of resin and sea water, 
his paragraphs are resonant with whistles and general alarms. He tells a 
story of a burning cargo in a far off sea, of lifeboats launched in storms, 
of brave rescues, and sudden deaths. It is plain he enjoys the telling of 
the story.  
But not so when he ponders his patent cases. Then he writes only of 
claims and specifications, of prior art and anticipations. Of the inven-
tor—nary a word. 
Id. at 329-30. 
 58. The heroic inventor may be functioning in this context as a decision-making 
heuristic. See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 
2002) (on file with author) (providing examples from securities litigation). 
 59. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 2519 (U.S. Jun. 18, 
2001) (No. 00-1543 ). 
 60. Id. at 620 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Linn wor-
ried that: 
[T]he majority’s new rule will substantially increase the cost of obtain-
ing patent protection, and may in fact become prohibitively high for in-
dividual inventors and start-up companies . . . . These increases in costs 
and complexity will also come at a time when greater prosecution in-
vestments may be hard for many applicants to justify because the 
commercial value of the inventions covered may not then be fully ap-
parent. In my view, this will most detrimentally impact individual in-
ventors and start-up companies. . . . 
Id. at 624. 
 61. Id. at 628.  
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sion, judges also debate whether various substantive patent law rules 
should be subject to exceptions or limitations for independent inventors: 
for example, the on-sale62 and public use bars,63 and damages under the 
reasonable royalty methodology64 and other, more creative, damages theo-
ries.65 
                                                                                                                         
 62. E.g., Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(upholding the application of the on-sale bar to a transaction between arguably related 
entities, but seeming to suggest that the bar might not apply to cases in which “an indi-
vidual inventor takes a design to a fabricator and pays the fabricator for its services in 
fabricating a few sample products”). 
 63. E.g., Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reviewing 
whether an independent inventor’s pre-critical date uses of an invention were barring 
public uses or experimental uses). Judge Lourie, for the panel majority, acknowledged 
that relatively informal and “seemingly casual” activities undertaken by independent in-
ventors might qualify as experimental use for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), but insisted 
that evidence of “the same basic elements that are required to validate any experimental 
program” must still be present. Id. at 1121. Judge Lourie goes on to state that: 
The law does not waive statutory requirements for inventors of lesser 
sophistication. When one distributes his invention to members of the 
public under circumstances that evidence a near total disregard for su-
pervision and control concerning its use, the absence of these minimal 
indicia of experimentation require a conclusion that the invention was 
in public use. 
Id. at 1122. 
  Judge Plager dissented. He rendered a classic portrait of the lone inventor: 
This is not a contest between . . . the two big competitors in this field . . 
. . If it were, we could expect the combination of engineering and legal 
staffs on each side to be punctilious about observing the niceties of our 
prior opinions on how to conduct experiments so as to avoid any possi-
ble running afoul of the public use bar. No, this is a home-made im-
provement by a man with only a high school education who worked on 
boats and boat engines, including his own, where he kept encountering 
the problem . . . that [others] had failed to solve. He solved it by trial 
and error, with an ingenious bushing of his own design, and, on his 
grandfather's metal lathe, after several tries, fashioned a half-dozen pro-
totype seals that looked like they might do the job. 
Id. at 1123. 
  According to Judge Plager, the majority clearly should have taken account of the 
plaintiff’s status as an independent inventor, excusing his failure to keep detailed records 
and to obtain appropriate confidentiality agreements, rather than demanding a level of 
legal sophistication that “we lawyers, with our clean and dry hands, have come to prefer.” 
Id. at 1124. 
 64. See Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (observing 
that the use of a pure willing licensor/willing licensee model, without regard to other 
Georgia Pacific factors, ‘risks creation of the perception that blatant, blind appropriation 
of inventions patented by individual, nonmanufacturing inventors is the profitable, can’t-
lose course”) (quoting Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 
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I do not mean to draw grandiose inferences here. Judges may have no 
conscious motivation for reverting to the heroic inventor narrative; they 
may simply perceive that they are reporting the facts of the cases before 
them. Whether out of necessity or desire, by continuing to link plaintiff-
patentees with the independent inventor motif, judges ensure the motif’s 
lingering relevance to patent policy debates. 
The normative implications of this linkage are unclear. Economists 
and others have disagreed throughout the twentieth century about whether 
independent inventors or corporate R&D groups contribute more pro-
foundly to technological innovation.66 Historians have worried that the 
impulse to lionize individuals as inventor-heroes has the potential to cause 
mischief in the historical record.67 Legal commentators have expressed 
                                                                                                                         
1575 (Fed. Cir.1988)). But cf. Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1580-81 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996) (cautioning against the use of a punitive “Panduit kicker” in calculating a rea-
sonable royalty). 
 65. An examination of the inventor-as-hero phenomenon would hardly be complete 
without at least passing reference to the war of the windshield wipers, pitting Robert 
Kearns against the automobile industry. In Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994), one of Kearns’ many cases, Kearns had prevailed on a claim against Chrysler 
for damages for Chrysler’s past infringement, but additionally sought to have Chrysler 
enjoined from producing the infringing products for a predetermined future period, even 
though the infringed patents had expired. The post-expiration injunctive relief, Kearns 
reasoned, compensated him for the loss of true “exclusivity” under his patents. Id. at 
1549. The Federal Circuit expressed sympathy with Kearns’ complaint “that his patents 
have expired without his ever being able to exclude others from practice of his invention, 
especially since he is an individual inventor contending with a multitude of giant corpora-
tions,” but refused the requested relief. Id. at 1550-51; see also id. at 1551 n.11 (adding 
that “[t]he fact that Kearns has fired several of his attorneys and attempted to conduct 
massive multiple suits pro se may be relevant to his dilemma”). 
 66. An oft-cited source in the early 1960s literature on the role of independent in-
ventors at that time is JOHN JEWKES ET AL., THE SOURCES OF INVENTION 223-25 (1958) 
(concluding that even as of the mid-twentieth century, inventors working independently 
of large organizations were still contributing significantly to technological progress); see 
also WILLIAM B. BENNETT, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM: AN ECONOMIC INTERPRE-
TATION 197-98 (1943) (asserting that “it might be argued that the independent inventor 
assumes an ever greater importance as a larger portion of American patents spring from 
corporate research” because corporate research shuns risky, pioneering endeavors); 
GEORGE E. FOLK, PATENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS: A SUMMARY, ANALYSIS, AND 
EVALUATION OF THE RECORD ON PATENTS OF THE TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
COMMITTEE 144-66 (1942) (summarizing testimony on the role of independent inventors 
in the 1940s U.S. economy and concluding that encouraging independent inventors 
should continue as a focus of the U.S. patent system). 
 67. Louis C. Hunter, The Heroic Theory of Invention, in TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE IN AMERICA 25-46 (Edwin T. Layton ed., 1973) (noting the tendency of histori-
ans to attribute important technological innovations to individual heroic figures, when in 
fact such innovations routinely have come about through the collective efforts of multiple 
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suspicion that the independent inventor motif may skew legislative policy 
debates.68 Perhaps Federal Circuit judges should resolve to become more 
cautious about deploying heroic inventor rhetoric in opinions, or at least 
take a hard look at the argument that special rules or exceptions should 
apply to independent inventors, to better ensure that such claims rest on a 
legitimate policy basis rather than a literary tradition.69  
In the context of patent reform through patent litigation, it may be dif-
ficult to evaluate how much influence to attribute to the heroic inventor 
motif. In the context of patent reform through the legislative process, 
however, the influence and pervasiveness of the motif are more easily 
                                                                                                                         
contributors). Hunter uses the invention of the steamboat as an illustration of the phe-
nomenon. 
 68. See, e.g., John C. Stedman, The U.S. Patent System and Its Current Problems, 
42 TEX. L. REV. 450, 496 (1954) (arguing that while “[t]here are frequent assertions that 
small business needs the patent system and gets more protection from it than big busi-
ness, and defenders of the patent system rarely have difficulty rounding up “small busi-
ness” witnesses to testify whenever the patent system is under attack,” it remains unclear 
to what extent these assertions “are anecdotal rather than general, or based upon emotion 
rather than fact”). 
 69. While they are at it, it might also be advisable for judges to consider the poten-
tial emergence of a competing motif—the heroic infringer. Arguably, the Cellpro patent 
litigation qualifies as a narrative of this type. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 978 F. 
Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1997). Judge McKelvie, opining on damages, wrote: 
One element of the strategy CellPro has adopted in this battle has been 
to hold itself out as a warrior in a twentieth-century holy crusade. It 
claims it is out to advance science, to save lives, to fight cancer, and 
improve the human condition. If it infringed Dr. Civin’s patents, so it 
says, it was only to do good. That is the image CellPro seeks to project 
of itself in this litigation and elsewhere. 
Id. at 196.  
  He proceeded to comment that while there is “some truth” to the image that 
CellPro sought to project, “[i]n other ways, however, this image is a facade constructed 
by the venture capitalists” who started CellPro. Id. Judge McKelvie was not amused, and 
imposed enhanced damages. CellPro offered its take on the litigation in a popular book, 
RICK MURDOCK & DAVID FISHER, PATIENT NUMBER ONE: A TRUE STORY OF HOW ONE 
CEO TOOK ON CANCER AND BIG BUSINESS IN THE FIGHT OF HIS LIFE (2000). 
  Law review commentary on the case focuses on the issue of march-in rights. 
Because a federally funded research project had generated the inventions claimed in the 
Johns Hopkins patents, those patents were potentially subject to compulsory licensing 
under the “march-in” rights provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 203(1). Cellpro petitioned the fed-
eral funding agency (the NIH) to exercise march-in rights, but the NIH declined after 
extensive administrative review. See generally Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded In-
ventions: The Bayh-Dole Act and the Hopkins v. Cellpro March-in Rights Controversy, 8 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211 (2000); Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey, Patents, 
Products, and Public Health: An Analysis of the CellPro March-In Petition, 14 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 1095 (1999).  
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demonstrated. Commentaries and legislative studies on U.S. patent law 
reform in the mid-twentieth century periodically acknowledged the inter-
ests of independent inventors, generally focusing on the cost and complex-
ity of patent prosecution and litigation.70 A mid-1950’s legislative report71 
acknowledged the obstacles faced by independent inventors,72 and con-
cluded that: 
the individual inventor . . . performs a vital and important func-
tion. The patent system is designed to encourage this type of in-
ventor, and the patent statutes, Patent Office administration, and 
the patent system as a whole must be considered, and improved 
where necessary, in the light of this purpose.73 
                                                                                                                         
 70. See, e.g., FLOYD VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM 265, 261-84 
(1956) (identifying the expense of interference proceedings and litigation among the de-
fects of the patent system that might frustrate the efforts of independent inventors); A.J. 
Hayes, The Independent Inventor’s Interest, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 298, 303 (1965) 
(questioning rules for ownership of employee inventions and asserting that patent ad-
ministration must be kept “as inexpensive and simple as possible”); David Rines, Do We 
Need a Patent System?, 51 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 501 (1969) (answering yes, and lamenting 
that the expense of patent litigation might discourage independent inventors from disclos-
ing their inventions via the patent system). 
  A relevant legislative study is STAFF OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, 
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., INDE-
PENDENT INVENTORS AND THE PATENT SYSTEM (Comm. Print 1961) (C.D. Tuska, author) 
(attempting to gauge the patent activities of various independent inventors through a 
largely inscrutable analysis of selected tax cases involving licensing royalties and the 
like). 
  For commentary of more recent vintage, but in this same tradition, see Donald 
Grant Kelly, America’s Inventors Have Arrived (And We Thought They Were “Invisi-
ble.”), 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 601 (1998), describing progress on “inven-
tor-friendly” patent legislation proposals. 
 71. REVIEW OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM, S. REP. NO. 84-1464 (1956). 
 72. The report related that: 
The subcommittee heard an almost unanimous chorus of dis-
satisfaction from individual inventors. The normal market, in-
vestment, and business hazards attending any innovation—
whether a new product, a new machine, or a substantive im-
provement—are already so large that the additional and . . . as 
they see it, unnecessary administrative and judicial hazards 
now incurred in securing and protecting a patent represent the 
straw that breaks the camel’s back. 
Id. at 2. 
 73. Id. 
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Similarly, in Small Business and the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 
1967,74 one commentator identified several proposed reforms that would 
disadvantage independent inventors, including first-to-file provisions,75 
early publication coupled with pre-grant opposition and post-grant revoca-
tion,76 and the proposed elimination of the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) grace pe-
riod.77 A reform that would have afforded applicants the option to file 
“preliminary” applications (comparable to provisional applications under 
current U.S. law) likewise came under fire.78 
In some instances, pressure on behalf of independent inventors has led 
directly to proposals, and sometimes legislation, expressly alleviating bur-
dens of independent inventors. Perhaps the most obvious example is legis-
lation providing that qualified “small entities” can receive reductions in 
government fees associated with patent prosecution.79 Other recent initia-
tives have included proposals for subsidizing foreign patent filings80 and 
fee-shifting for patent litigation against the federal government.81 
                                                                                                                         
 74. William E. Schuyler, Jr., Small Business and the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 
1967, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 122 (1967). 
 75. Schuyler argued that first-to-file provisions would force inventors to file earlier 
and more often, purely for defensive purposes. Id. at 125-26. Presumably this would gen-
erate increased patent prosecution costs, the burden of which would fall hardest on small 
business. 
 76. Pre-grant oppositions would contribute to delay in patent issuance. Id. at 127. In 
general, according to Schuyler, opposition and revocation proceedings favored the well-
heeled—those having the resources to monitor published patent applications routinely so 
as to identify targets for oppositions, to initiate opposition proceedings, and to respond 
when subjected to such proceedings on one’s own applications. Small business lacked the 
resources to monitor and to initiate proceedings, but was likely to be subjected to such 
proceedings. Id. at 132-33. 
 77. Id. at 131-32 (arguing that the lack of a grace period would be particularly prob-
lematic for small business because they are least likely to consult a patent lawyer until 
after some development effort—and valuable time—has been invested). 
 78. Id. at 129-30 (offering the familiar argument that the provisional application 
might not contain an adequate description to support claims in a subsequent regular ap-
plication, exposing the applicant to possible invalidating intervening prior art). Of course, 
this would be equally true for large and small-entity applicants, assuming no disparity in 
the quality of counsel preparing the provisional application. 
 79. See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1994) (providing for a reduction in fees for independent 
inventors and other qualifying entities); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.9, 1.27, 1.28 (1999) (procedures 
for establishing entitlement to reduced fees and correcting pertinent errors). The relevant 
regulations recently have been amended to simplify claims to small entity status. See 65 
Fed. Reg. 54659 (2000); see also DH Tech., Inc. v. Synergystex Int’l, 154 F.3d 1333 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (vacating and remanding district court ruling that a patent was unen-
forceable where the patentee had erroneously paid small entity fees). 
 80. The “SBIR and STTR Foreign Patent Protection Act of 2001.” See Legisla-
tion/Patents: Bill Would Fund Patent Costs of Small Businesses, 62 PAT. TRADEMARK & 
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In other instances, it appears that lobbying efforts on behalf of inde-
pendent inventors has materially affected more general patent legislation. 
For example, provisions on the publication of pending patent applications 
18 months after filing, enacted as part of the 1999 reform package,82 allow 
applicants to opt out of the publication regime if they certify that they 
have not and will not file foreign applications in jurisdictions requiring 
publication 18 months after filing.83 These provisions bear the unmistak-
able influence of lobbying on behalf of independent inventors.  
That lobbying effort included liberal reference to the heroic inventor. 
For example, William P. Parker, President of the Vermont Inventors As-
sociation, testified on disadvantages of the early publication provisions: 
 [O]thers are able to view and assess an innovation before the ac-
tual inventor can either commercialize it or even know if it will 
be granted a patent. For a large corporation with a legal staff and 
financial resources, such early review poses no threat. But for the 
individual inventor, early publication can lead to ruin. Often he 
will have spent five years of his life between conceiving the idea 
and acquiring a patent. He uses the money that might have been 
spent on a car, a house, or his child’s education to bring his idea 
to fruition. Unlike the corporation, he has no budget for legal 
                                                                                                                         
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 369 (Aug. 17, 2001) (reporting on S. 1323, introduced August 2, 
2001). SBIR refers to the Small Business Innovation Research program; STTR refers to 
the Small Business Technology Transfer program. The bill would offer grants for foreign 
patent filings, in exchange for a portion of royalties. See also J. Douglas Hawkins, Impor-
tance and Access of International Patent Protection for the Independent Inventor, 3 U. 
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145, 146 (1995) (asserting that the independent inventor “is 
still responsible for a disproportionate amount of input in the invention process” and ar-
guing that fees for PCT filings must be controlled to facilitate the acquisition of foreign 
patent protection by independent inventors). 
 81. JUST COMPENSATION OF PATENT OWNERS FOR UNLICENSED USE BY UNITED 
STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 104-373 (1995) (accompanying H.R. 632, whose purpose was “to 
help small business, independent inventors and nonprofit organizations recover the legal 
costs associated with defending their patents when the Federal government is found liable 
for taking them,” e.g., under application of 28 U.S.C. §1498(a)). 
  See also Patent Law Revision Part 2: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 616 (1968) 
(statement of Henry J. Cappello, NSBA consultant) (proposing establishment of a special 
patent litigation fund to defray attorney’s fees for independent inventors initiating patent 
infringement actions). 
 82. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (Supp. 2001) (addressing publication); id. § 154(d) 
(addressing provisional rights to compensation for unauthorized exploitation of inven-
tions claimed in published patent applications). 
 83. Id. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i). 
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counsel should his idea be stolen. The rules for publication must 
reflect this discrepancy.84 
Early publication, according to Parker, might unwittingly confer a sub-
stantial benefit on “idea thieves.” Upon early publication of a patent appli-
cation claiming a commercially valuable invention: 
 [t]he idea-thieves can make money from the idea before the pat-
ent even issues and when they are challenged, are in a better po-
sition financially to defend themselves than the legitimate owner. 
Worse, if this party is in a foreign country or is a large corpora-
tion, then the inventor’s recourse is virtually hopeless.85 
Testimony from the 1990 legislative debate addressing the impact of 
proposed patent law reforms on independent inventors and small business 
was among the most caustic in recent memory.86 Congress’ response ex-
                                                                                                                         
 84. The Omnibus Patent Act of 1997: Hearings on S. 507 and H.R. 400 (S. Hrg. 
105-95) Before Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 49 (1997). 
 85. Id. Parker proceeded to recommend that the individual inventor have the option 
to withhold publication if the application was not being submitted overseas, and urged 
that “[e]arly publication would be more acceptable to individual inventors if it occurred 3 
months after the second office action.” Id. Parker also argued that a provisional rights 
provision giving inventors a right to collect a royalty for unauthorized use of a published 
application would not adequately compensate the individual inventor (because he envi-
sions a scenario where multiple unlicensed competitors flood the market and undermine 
the true inventor’s marketing strategy). Provisional rights provisions giving the inventor 
the right to collect` “substantial” damages would be more acceptable. 
 86. See, e.g., Impact on U.S. Exporters of the New GATT Patent Accord: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. On International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. 
on International Relations, 104th Cong. (1995), which included discussion of an agree-
ment between Ron Brown, then the Secretary of Commerce, and Japanese officials under 
which the Clinton administration agreed to press for certain U.S. patent reforms (includ-
ing early publication of patent applications and reexamination reform) while the Japanese 
would institute certain reforms to the Japanese patent system. David L. Hill, President of 
the “Patent Enforcement Fund, Inc.,” likened early publication and reexamination reform 
as memorialized in the bilateral agreement to “an attack on the U.S. economy which in 
the long-term would be comparable to the military attack from Japan at Pearl Harbor.” Id. 
at 2; see also id. at 68-77 (appending to Hill’s prepared statement an article, entitled The 
Putsch to Enfeeble the Independent U.S. Inventor, characterizing proposals for early pub-
lication, reexamination reform, and first-to-file as being “targeted to weaken the position 
of the independent inventor” and thereby undermine the U.S. economy); id. at 98-109 
(written statement of Ronald J. Riley, Advisory Board President, Alliance for American 
Innovation, similar in tone and content); Changes in U.S. Patent Law and Their Implica-
tions for Energy and Environment Research and Development: Hearing before the Sub-
comm. On Energy and Environment of the House Comm. on Science, 104th Cong. 197 
(1996) (quoting the statement of Salvatore J. Monte, executive of a specialty chemical 
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tended beyond compromising the publication regime. In a rather transpar-
ent gesture that sought, perhaps, to mollify independent inventors, Con-
gress labeled the reform package the American Inventors Protection Act of 
1999, even though it contained numerous reforms that independent inven-
tors opposed.87 Moreover, the Act commenced with a title on “Inventor’s 
Rights,” concerning restrictions on Invention Promotion businesses, which 
had attained a notorious reputation for preying on independent inventors.88  
Sympathy for the plight of the independent inventor also motivates 
proposals for second tier patent systems in various parts of the world.89 
Second tier systems generally promise less cumbersome pre-grant proce-
dures, which entail correlative savings in time and cost, little or no sub-
stantive pre-grant examination, and softened patentability requirements 
(particularly a diminished threshold for obviousness).90  
In the new Australian “Innovation Patent” regime (“IP Australia”), one 
example of a second tier regime, applicants can file applications and pay 
relevant fees online. IP Australia represents that most innovation patents 
will be granted within one month of application filing.91 All of this, ac-
cording to IP Australia, is “designed to suit the needs of Australian small 
                                                                                                                         
company: “Laying open patents after 18 months opens the small inventor to patent flood-
ing tactics and challenges from deep-pocketed Japanese industrial cartels”). 
 87. Some found irony here. E.g., Phyllis Schlafly, Don’t Fall for Phony Patent Re-
form, at http://www.inventionconvention.com/inventorsvoice/urgentalerts/080199schla-
fly.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2001). Schafly notes: 
This bill is called the American Inventors Protection Act, but should be 
called the Inventors Elimination Act. The independent inventors would 
be squeezed out and their inventions stolen from them, all for the bene-
fit of the foreigners and the giant corporations. 
Id. 
 88. The relevant provision is now codified at 35 U.S.C. § 297 (1994) (imposing 
disclosure requirements on “invention promoters,” recognizing a civil cause of action for 
customers who are defrauded by such promoters, and providing optional statutory dam-
ages in such civil actions). 
 89. See generally Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 151 (1999) (criticizing second tier patent proposals). But cf. Uma Suthersanen, In-
cremental Inventions in Europe: A Legal and Economic Appraisal of Second Tier Pat-
ents, 2001 J. BUS. L. 319 (offering a cautiously optimistic assessment). 
 90. An example is the Australian “Innovation Patent.” See Anne Duffy, Australia: 
Patents—Patents Amendment (Innovation Patents) Act 2000, 23(4) EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. N37-39 (2001) (describing the legislation as enacted); Janis, supra note 89, at 167-
73 (describing relevant proposals). 
 91. The Innovation Patents Kit, at http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/patents/-
P_innvopat_about.htm at 3 (last visited Mar. 30, 2002). 
 3$7(17$%2/,7,21,60  
 
to medium sized enterprises (“SMEs”) and individuals and help reduce the 
risks involved in research and development.”92 
In debating second tier patent regimes, modern patent policymakers 
are, no doubt unwittingly, invoking Dickens. At the conclusion of A Poor 
Man’s Tale, Dickens’ protagonist, Old John, is bidding goodbye to his 
carpenter friend, Thomas Joy, when Thomas Joy delivers a full-fledged 
legislative proposal for a second tier patent system: 
Thomas said to me, when we parted, ‘John, if the laws of this 
country were as honest as they ought to be, you would have 
come to London—registered an exact description and drawing of 
your invention—paid half-a-crown or so for doing of it—and 
therein and thereby have got your Patent.’ My opinion is the 
same as Thomas Joy.93 
One cannot help but expect that patent law reform debates will con-
tinue to revert periodically to narratives about the heroic inventor. 
III. THE ABOLITIONIST MOVEMENT:  ESSENTIAL THEMES 
AND THEIR MODERN COUNTERPARTS 
Following the passage of the 1852 Act,94 patent reform efforts gradu-
ally transformed into a full-fledged movement emphasizing patent law 
abolition over patent law reform. The patent abolitionist debate caught the 
attention of a wide range of interests, among them patent professionals, 
academics, inventors, and business owners.95 One can capture the flavor of 
the debate, if not its full political complexity, by viewing it as a dialogue 
between leading figures:  Robert Macfie, an ardent abolitionist, and Hind-
march and Webster, a pair of patent lawyers who supported reform, but 
opposed abolition.96 
                                                                                                                         
 92. Id. at 4. In previous work, I have expressed doubts about these claims. See Janis, 
supra note 89, at 178-88 (questioning whether second tier systems will enhance inde-
pendent inventor potential to obtain meaningful, enforceable patent rights).  
 93. PHILLIPS, supra note 22, at 21. 
 94. The approach of the Great Exhibition of 1851 gave added urgency to the patent 
law reform agenda of 1850-51. E.g., COULTER, supra note 14, at 39. For general back-
ground on the Great Exhibition, see, e.g., JEFFREY A. AUERBACH, THE GREAT EXHIBI-
TION OF 1851 (1999). For an interesting brief account focusing on international trade im-
plications, see John Kemper, Internationalism and the Search for a National Identity: 
Britain and the Great Exhibition of 1851 (2000), at http://www.stanford.edu/group/w1/-
Spring2000/exhibition/paper.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2002). 
 95. E.g., COULTER, supra note 14, at 91-92. 
 96. While it might be supposed that the debate would have pitted abolitionists 
against defenders of the status quo (rather than abolitionists versus reformers), in fact 
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Robert Andrew Macfie, a sugar refiner who also served in the House 
of Commons during part of the time period when abolition was being de-
bated,97 was single-handedly responsible for a good share of the pro-
abolition literature,98 and a good share of invective about the patent sys-
tem.99 Hindmarch, a leading patent law commentator100 and barrister, pub-
                                                                                                                         
there were few defenders of the status quo. See, e.g., Victor M. Batzel, Legal Monopoly 
in Liberal England: The Patent Controversy in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 22 BUS. 
HIST. 189, 190 (1980). 
 97. Id. at 59-60 (describing Macfie’s sugar manufacturing interests); id. at 136 (tell-
ing of Macfie’s election to the House of Commons in 1868); id. at 160 (relating Macfie’s 
unsuccessful bid for re-election in 1874, when Disraeli’s conservative government came 
into power). 
 98. Included among Macfie’s compendious bibliography on the subject of patent 
reform are numerous original writings and compilations of others’ works. See ROBERT 
ANDREW MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS: PLEAS AND PLANS FOR 
CHEAPER BOOKS AND GREATER INDUSTRIAL FREEDOM, WITH DUE REGARD TO INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS, THE CLAIMS OF TALENT, THE DEMANDS OF TRADE, AND THE WANTS 
OF THE PEOPLE (1879) (2 vols.) (collecting excerpts from many sources) [hereinafter 
MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS]; ROBERT ANDREW MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS 
ON THE ABOLITION OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, 
GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS (1869) (collecting letters, papers, and speeches by 
Macfie and others) [hereinafter MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS]; ROBERT ANDREW 
MACFIE, THE PATENT QUESTION UNDER FREE TRADE: A SOLUTION OF DIFFICULTIES BY 
ABOLISHING OR SHORTENING THE INVENTORS’ MONOPOLY, AND INSTITUTING NATIONAL 
RECOMPENSES (1864) [hereinafter MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION] (incorporating Macfie’s 
1863 report to the Congress of the Association for the Promotion of Social Science, as 
well as extracts from various works authored by others). 
  Of related interest is ROBERT ANDREW MACFIE, FREE-TRADE IN MANUFAC-
TURES (2d ed. 1881) (compilation of materials from various sources). The full title gives 
a glimpse of Macfie’s characteristic style and tone: CRIES IN A CRISIS, ANENT FREE-
TRADE IN MANUFACTURES SHATTERED BY CONCESSIVE TREATIES AND AGGRESSIVE 
BOUNTIES THAT FAVOUR FOREIGN AIMS UPON OUR INDUSTRIES AND SHIPPING: AND 
ANENT THE EMPIRE AND EMIGRATION, PARLIAMENT AND ITS PROCEDURE. 
 99. According to Macfie: 
 I am sure that nobody can go over the evidence . . . without becom-
ing convinced that the trade and manufactures of this country are seri-
ously obstructed, fettered, retarded, harassed, and burdened, sometimes 
demoralised, often wronged, or even robbed, by the multitude and 
vexatious character of Patents . . . 
MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 61.  
  In similar tones, Macfie quotes a paper presented by J. Stirling, entitled “Patent 
Right,” as proclaiming that “[t]he whole history of Patents is a long-continued story of 
litigation and disappointment; and the more admirable the invention, the greater is the 
certainty of difficulty and loss.” MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 121. 
  The piece de resistance comes from Lord Granville, who is supposed to have 
remarked in the Upper House in 1851 that: 
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lished a slim volume in 1851 specifically devoted to patent law reform.101 
Webster, another barrister, was also a prominent treatise writer102 and took 
a substantial role in abolition debates.103  
The patent abolitionism debate in Britain took place predominantly 
from the 1860s to the early 1870s. The National Association for the Pro-
motion of Social Science, formed in 1857, held annual congresses which 
regularly featured addresses, papers, and debates on patent law reform and 
abolition. Macfie and Webster figured prominently in such debates, which 
extended over a period of some fifteen years.104 Abolitionists eventually 
succeeded in taking their case to Parliament, which formed numerous 
study committees during the period. From 1875 until the passage of the 
1883 Act, Parliament debated a multiplicity of legislative reform pack-
ages.105 The movement gradually lost its abolitionist character and be-
came, again, a reform movement,106 due in part to the onset of a severe 
economic depression.107 
                                                                                                                         
The only persons who derive any advantage from the law of Patents are 
the lawyers. Except, perhaps, warrants for horses, there is no subject 
which gives such an opportunity for roguery as the Law of Patents. 
MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 212-213. 
 100. See HINDMARCH, supra note 16. 
 101. See HINDMARCH, supra note 25. 
 102. See WEBSTER, supra note 16; see also THOMAS WEBSTER, ON PROPERTY IN DE-
SIGNS AND INVENTIONS IN THE ARTS AND MANUFACTURES (London, Chapman and Hall 
1853); THOMAS WEBSTER, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LETTERS PATENT FOR INVEN-
TIONS: STATUTES, PRACTICAL FORMS, AND DIGEST OF REPORTED CASES (1841), micro-
formed on 19th-Century Legal Treatises, Fiche 55,281-55,282 (Research Publications 
Int’l). 
 103. The intellectual property bar, a major force in modern U.S. patent policy de-
bates, organized in Britain beginning in the early 1880s, too late to influence the aboli-
tionist debate, although individual lawyers such as Webster certainly made themselves 
heard. See COULTER, supra note 14, at 133.  
 104. Id. at 111-13. 
 105. Id. 
 106. COULTER, supra note 14, at 160-61 (asserting that while organizations continued 
to apply pressure for patent abolition into the 1870s, abolitionist fervor in the Parliament 
dissipated gradually by the mid-1870s). 
 107. DUTTON, supra note 1, at 29 (asserting that with the onset of the mid-1870s 
Great Depression and the “emergence of protectionism,” the patent abolitionist move-
ment suddenly collapsed; “intense international rivalry now made the patent system per-
fectly respectable once more”). Coulter sees the decline of the abolitionist movement as 
more gradual. COULTER, supra note 14, at 160-61. 
  For discourse concerning the Great Depression of the mid-1870s (and the debate 
among economists as to whether it really existed), see LEWIS C.B. SEAMAN, VICTORIAN 
ENGLAND: ASPECTS OF ENGLISH AND IMPERIAL HISTORY 1837-1901, at 262-79 (1973), 
commenting on the existence of a “Great Depression” in the British economy beginning 
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Just as it drew in a wide range of interested parties, the patent abolition 
debate also encompassed a wide range of substantive patent issues, three 
of which are particularly relevant to modern patent reform. The first con-
cerns alleged defects in the judicial administration of the patent system, 
especially the role of juries and the use of generalist judges in patent 
litigation.108 The second involves baseline philosophical justifications for 
the granting of patent rights, juxtaposing natural rights against utilitarian-
ism.109 Finally, the third involves the intersection between patents and in-
ternational trade, extending both to “free trade” arguments and to primi-
tive steps towards patent law harmonization.110  
A. Judicial Administration:  The Jury and Specialized Courts 
Many of the high-profile patent cases of the past decade have centered 
around fundamental disputes over the judicial administration of the patent 
system.111 Two classes of disputes have occupied center stage in the mod-
                                                                                                                         
in about 1873, and SIDNEY POLLARD, BRITAIN’S PRIME AND BRITAIN’S DECLINE: THE 
BRITISH ECONOMY 1870-1914, at 241-43 (1989), discussing political dimensions of the 
late 19th century British depression.  
 108. See infra Part III.A. 
 109. See infra Part III.B. 
 110. See infra Part III.C. Utilitarianism and free trade have been called “the two 
dominant ideologies of the mid-Victorian era.” COULTER, supra note 14, at 73. 
 111. That the jury issue has preoccupied modern patent jurists hardly need be re-
counted. From Lockwood, to Markman, to Hilton Davis, and now—less directly—in 
Festo, the Federal Circuit has been locked in a battle over the extent to which the jury 
should participate in the patent system. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 976 (Fed. Cir. 
1995), vacated by 116 S.Ct. 29 (1996); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 
967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. War-
ner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Festo Corp. 
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
  Scholarly commentary has been abundant. A very small sample of relevant arti-
cles treating various aspects of the general problem includes, for example, Kenneth R. 
Adamo, Reforming Jury Practice in Patent Cases: Suggestions Towards Learning to 
Love Using an Eighteenth Century System While Approaching the Twenty-First Century, 
78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 345 (1996); Mark D. Janis, Judge and Jury Roles 
in Equivalents Analysis, Commentary on Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, 74 
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 621 (1992); Allen N. Littman, The Jury’s Role in De-
termining Key Issues in Patent Cases, 37 IDEA 207 (1997); Michael A. Sartori, An Eco-
nomic Incentives Analysis of the Jury’s Role in Patent Litigation, 
79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 331 (1997); Philippe Signore, On the Role of Ju-
ries in Patent Litigation (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791 (2001). 
  The Federal Circuit has also taken the topic up at its judicial conferences. E.g., 
The Fourteenth Annual Judiciary Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, 170 F.R.D. 534, 598-620 (1996) (discussing the challenges raised by 
the use of juries in patent trials); see also Paul R. Michel & Michelle Rhyu, Improving 
Patent Jury Trials, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 89 (1996) (providing a judicial perspective). 
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ern reform debate:  (1) the role of the jury in patent litigation, particularly 
as to enforcement issues; and (2) the efficacy of the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit—more generally, the desirability of creating “expert” 
tribunals for patent cases and their proper roles in the federal judiciary. 
Documents from the British patent controversy illustrate that, by the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, patent scholars were already debating these 
same issues of judicial administration—identifying similar problems and 
proposing similar solutions. 
In 1851, Hindmarch reported that “[m]any persons obtain an opinion 
that the courts of law of this country are not fitted to determine questions 
respecting patent rights.”112 This objection to the efficacy of the “courts of 
law” may be attributed to the competency either of judges to decide the 
relevant questions of patent law, of juries to decide relevant questions of 
technological fact, or both. Some reformers found fault with the judges, 
and contended “that peculiar tribunals ought therefore to be erected with 
exclusive jurisdiction over all suits respecting patents.”113 Webster also 
noted the division over the question of specialized tribunals, and implied 
that he favored them. Sounding remarkably like a modern-day commenta-
tor on the relationship between district courts and the Federal Circuit in 
modern U.S. patent matters, Webster observed: 
Concerning litigation on patents, opinion is divided between a 
special tribunal or some modification of the existing system. It 
may be observed, that the real trial of a patent case lies in the 
court of appeal, and the chief question remaining is the mode of 
trial at the preliminary stage, so as best to ascertain the facts for 
the consideration of the court.114 
Hindmarch disagreed, asserting that judges had performed capably in 
resolving legal questions in patent cases,115 and blaming juries instead for 
the inefficacy of the courts. According to Hindmarch, “there can be no 
                                                                                                                         
 112. HINDMARCH, supra note 25, at 19. 
 113. Id. 
      114. TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 886 (1863) (George W. Hastings, ed.) [hereinafter NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 
1863] (reporting Webster’s oral comments). 
 115. HINDMARCH, supra note 25, at 19 (“The complaint . . . cannot apply to the mode 
in which the law respecting patent privileges has in modern times been expounded by our 
judges, for they have uniformly given the most favourable interpretation to the law of 
which it was capable in favour of the rights of patentees; and although there have long 
been many acknowledged defects in the law, the legislature alone could apply the neces-
sary remedies.”).  
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doubt that juries are rarely, if ever, found to be fully competent”116 to de-
cide the fact questions in patent cases. Jury incompetence sprang both 
from intrinsic factors and the jury’s probable lack of education:  “In the 
absence of a thorough understanding of the facts brought before them in 
[patent] cases, juries are too prone to be swayed more by appeals to their 
feelings and prejudices than by their reason. . . . ”117 However, Hindmarch 
seemed unwilling to accept the proposition that juries would never be 
competent to handle patent cases. He thought that the “unfitness” of juries 
arose from “the limited nature of the education of the people, more par-
ticularly as to matters of science and art,”118 and contended that as educa-
tion on such subjects became “more and more general,” juries would be-
come better suited to decide cases involving technological facts.119 
If some found fault with judges, others found fault with experts. The 
following exchange between Macfie and Webster, before a House of 
Commons committee in 1871, illustrates Webster’s skepticism about the 
usefulness of expert witnesses: 
Macfie:  You have told the Committee in very apt language, 
that at present a trial [in a patent case] is a specula-
tion on the ignorance of the judge and jury; have you 
any cases that would illustrate that? 
Webster: I think almost every case, where there is any 
complication at all in an invention, which requires 
experts to explain it to the judge and jury, is a 
speculation, because you have the plaintiff starting 
with a number of scientific witnesses, and there is a 
kind of practical difficulty in the defendant’s way, if 
he does not call the same number of scientific 
witnesses . . . The present system has this great vice 
in it, that it allows witnesses to give evidence with 
regard to matters of opinion rather than matters of 
fact; and that would be checked at once by a judge 
with skilled assessors . . .120 
                                                                                                                         
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. 2 MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS, supra note 98, at 374 (reprinting extracts 
from the 1871 Report of the Committee of the House of Commons on Letters Patents). 
See also the comments of Sir Roundell Palmer, who advocated outright abolition of the 
British patent system:  
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Arguments about the cost of patent trials paralleled arguments about 
competency. As Hindmarch reported, other commentators cited the “great 
expense” of patent trials as another reason for creating patent tribunals 
separate from the general courts of law.121 Hindmarch recognized a fun-
damental problem with both the competency and cost arguments:  even if 
they were valid, they could not be confined to patent cases alone.122 Even 
in the nineteenth century, other types of civil cases involved complex fac-
tual questions.  
These issues appeared prominently in the U.S. patent reform agenda 
for a century and a half following the British patent controversy. The pro-
ject to create a patent-focused court of appeals in the United States en-
dured for nearly a century, and stands as perhaps the most commonly re-
peated reform suggested in the entirety of the twentieth century patent re-
form literature.123 The debate continues today over the success of the Fed-
                                                                                                                         
In dealing with Patent cases in a court of law there was generally a vast 
array of witnesses to be examined, consisting of mechanics, chemists, 
and scientific men of all sorts on one side and the other. Then there 
were the jury, who knew nothing of the subject, and the judge, who 
might be placed in a worse position, because he might imagine he 
understood all about it when he did not. . . .[I]t might very easily 
happen that an ingenious professional witness might so argue the case 
under the form of giving evidence as to lead the judge to think that he 
really knew all about it when such was not in reality the fact.  
MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 107. 
 121. HINDMARCH, supra note 25, at 20. Hindmarch expressed skepticism that the 
creation of an alternative, expert tribunal for patent cases would reduce the costs of patent 
litigation. See id. at 21 (“[T]hose who advocate the institution of a special tribunal . . . 
seem to forget that the expense of it would be great; probably much more in proportion to 
the business to be done, than the total amount of costs in patents actions tried in our 
courts of law . . . .”). 
 122. Id. at 20. (stating that “the great expense of law proceedings is not confined to 
patent suits: and patentees have no greater claim for relief in this respect than many other 
classes of persons”). 
 123. The literature on this issue is immense. For an exhaustive survey of legislative 
efforts to create a patent court of appeals from 1887 through 1921, see STAFF OF THE 
SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON 
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., SINGLE COURT OF PATENT APPEALS—A LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY 2-9 (1959) (Margaret M. Conway, author). 
  For scholarly commentary from the first half of the twentieth century, see, for 
example, Otto Raymond Barnett, The Proposed Court of Patent Appeals, 6 MICH. L. 
REV. 441 (1908); William H. Davis, Proposed Modifications in the Patent System, 12 
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 796 (1947); Evan A. Evans, Shall the United States Have a 
Special Patent Court of Appeals?, 36 U. ILL. L. REV. 643 (1942); Charles F. Meroni, 
Comments and Observations Concerning Recommendations in Report of the National 
Patent Planning Commission, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 117 (1944); Edwin J. Prindle, Pro-
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eral Circuit experiment, the role of the Supreme Court in the modern U.S. 
patent system, and the desirability of expert patent trial courts.124 
Similarly, it is not difficult to find expressions of judicial discontent 
over the use of juries in U.S. patent cases over the entire course of the 
twentieth century. Consider the unmasked skepticism and air of resigna-
tion evident in the jury charge in this 1901 patent infringement case: 
It is a very mistaken system of jurisprudence that leaves the de-
cision of the issues of fact that arise in a patent case to a jury. In 
the very nature of things, it is extremely awkward and difficult, 
and many times practically impossible, for 12 laymen, untrained 
in the examination of the intricate questions which so frequently 
arise in patent causes, without any facilities for taking notes, and 
with no opportunity for the lengthened reflection which is fre-
quently necessary to reach a wise conclusion in cases of this 
kind,—I say it is many times practically impossible for them to 
dispose of such questions.125 
                                                                                                                         
posal of a Single Court of Patent Appeals and Draft of a Bill Therefor, 13 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 438 (1931); Charles L. Reynolds, In Favor of a Single Court of Patent Appeals, 13 
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 596 (1931); Elliott J. Stoddard, Comments on Mr. Lane’s Letter as to 
the Bill for a Court of Patent Appeals, 14 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 188 (1932); Fritz Von 
Briesen, The Confusion of Patent Courts in the United States, 5 THE BRIEF 358 (1905) 
(discussing the idea of a single court of patent appeals); Edmund Wetmore, Patent Law, 
17 YALE L.J. 101 (1907); Report of Patent Committee to National Research Council, 1 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 341 (1919); and William R. Woodward, A Reconsideration of the Pat-
ent System as a Problem of Administrative Law, 55 HARV. L. REV. 950 (1942). Cf. Wal-
lace R. Lane, Why a Single Court of Patent Appeals is Not Necessary, 13 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 569 (1931); Frank E. Liverance, An Alternative for a Single Court of Patent Ap-
peals, 14 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 816 (1932); Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Liti-
gation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37 ABA 425 (1951). 
  For more recent commentary, see sources cited in Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in 
the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 392 nn.22-28 (2001).  
 124. An example can be found in John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial 
Court With a Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 
765, 782-83 (2000) (proposing that the U.S. Court of International Trade be given subject 
matter jurisdiction over patent cases in parallel with existing jurisdiction in the district 
courts). 
  The U.K. has an ongoing experiment with expert patent tribunals of first in-
stance, the Patents County Court. See John N. Adams, Choice of Forum in Patent Dis-
putes, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 497 (1995) (discussing history of Patents County 
Court); Richard Price, Patent Litigation In England—Quiet Revolution, 17 EUR. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 290 (1995) (noting early success and popularity of the Patents County Court). 
 125. Int’l Tooth Crown Co. v. Hanks Dental Ass’n, 111 F. 916, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1901), 
rev’d on other grounds, 130 F. 1022 (2d Cir. 1904) (Circuit Judge Lacombe, charging 
jury). 
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Ruling on a petition for mandamus, directing a district judge to rein-
state jury demands in a patent infringement lawsuit, Judge Sobeloff of the 
Fourth Circuit expressed similar sentiments several decades later: 
We are neither oblivious of nor insensitive to the contentions that 
the jury trial is a cumbersome and unwieldy mechanism for deal-
ing with the complex factual settings and intricate legal frame-
work of patent cases. We cannot dispute the assertion that the 
trial of all patent cases to juries would add significantly to the 
congestion of district court dockets.126 
Judges have written frankly about the need to rein in juries in patent 
cases through post-trial motion practice: 
The complex issues of validity, infringement, and accounting in 
patent cases do not often lend themselves today to proper deter-
mination by a lay jury, and it may frequently be necessary, in 
jury trials of patent cases, for the Court to set aside the jury ver-
dict and render judgment non obstante veredicto in the interest of 
justice . . . . A lay jury . . . could become hopelessly lost in an at-
tempt to resolve the more complex issues of a patent case involv-
ing complicated mechanical inventions.127 
In a scattering of other cases, courts express these same general frus-
trations and seek a variety of solutions.128 
                                                                                                                         
 126. Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 344 (4th Cir. 1971) (granting litigants’ 
request for jury, albeit grudgingly). 
 127. Railex Corp. v. Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 119, 124-25 (D.D.C. 1966). 
 128. See generally Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Burris Indus. 619 F.2d 660, 667 (7th 
Cir. 1980) (remarking that the case “is an excellent illustration of the wisdom of this 
court's observation that ‘members of the Patent Bar have wisely avoided jury trials in 
patent litigation’” and offering recommendations on the use of special verdicts on obvi-
ousness “because of the troublesome questions which seem to arise frequently where a 
complex patent case is submitted to a jury of lay people”) (quoting Panther Pumps & 
Eqpt. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225, 228 n.9 (7th Cir. 1972)); General Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 192, 197-98 (4th Cir. 1964) (ruling no abuse of discre-
tion to deny jury trial where party had waived rights, especially in view of “the 
technicalities involved in determining the issues of patent validity and infringement, the 
experience of the court in patent cases, the difficulties to be encountered in instructing a 
jury, and the doubtful ability of jurors with only ordinary experience to comprehend the 
complex issues and to reach a correct conclusion”); Great Plains Chem. Co. v. Micro 
Chem., Inc., 549 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Colo. 1982) (asserting that “[t]his case is a monument 
to the risk of futility in asking a jury to decide a complex patent case” and referring to 
proposals to create a special patents court). But cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research 
Corp., 547 F. Supp. 401, 406 n.3 (D. Minn. 1982) (holding that jury’s special verdict an-
swers should be reviewed under the typical j.n.o.v. standard, but questioning whether 
detailed special verdict questions “would merely confuse the jury and further complicate 
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It should be sobering to modern-day patent law reformers that, one 
hundred and fifty years after the British patent controversy, basic norma-
tive questions about the allocation of adjudicative authority between judge 
and jury and the efficacy of expert tribunals remain unresolved. Claims 
that modern patented technology is too complex for juries to comprehend 
simply echo the claims of Webster, Hindmarch, and others from decades 
ago. Perhaps these claims have been correct all along, and policymakers 
have failed to fashion adequate responses. Perhaps, on the other hand, the 
lesson is that the jury system is more resilient than we sometimes think, 
and we should guard against overreacting to claims that particular new 
technologies are too complex for lay juries. 
B. Natural Rights v. Utilitarianism 
Patent abolitionism cut to the core of the patent system. It stimulated a 
popular discussion over the fundamental philosophical justifications for 
the patent grant, and in many ways anticipated twentieth century theoreti-
cal scholarship on justifications for the patent system, ranging from de-
bates over natural rights justifications, to “incentive to disclose” and “in-
centive to invent” theories, reaching even to discussions of reward systems 
versus property rights systems. As detailed below, the patent abolitionist 
movement thus has made a substantial intellectual contribution to modern 
patent law reform.129  
1. Natural Rights Justification 
It was necessary for Macfie to rebut moral rights justifications for pat-
ents130 in order to present a convincing case for abolition of the patent sys-
tem.131 Presumably unwilling to take on the entrenched Continental vision 
of a moral rights justification for copyright, Macfie made his attack indi-
                                                                                                                         
verdict questions “would merely confuse the jury and further complicate their task” and 
asserting that “[t]he problem of submitting highly technical and complex questions—in 
any fashion—to a lay jury remains a peculiar difficulty in patent cases”). 
 129. For recognition of this contribution, see Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The 
Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1950). Scholarly 
treatments of the patent abolitionist movement are rare, and, to my knowledge, Machlup 
& Penrose is the only article to explore rigorously how pro- and anti-patent forces argued 
fundamental justificatory theories of the patent system. I need not repeat their analysis 
here; rather, in this brief section of the present article, I limit my analysis to a few perti-
nent observations, particularly on scholarly work that has been undertaken in the several 
decades since the Machlup & Penrose work.  
 130. I.e., that version of a natural rights argument holding that society has a moral 
obligation to recognize an inventor’s natural right in his or her invention. 
 131. Id. at 10 (articulating the moral rights argument); id. at 14 (noting that Macfie 
was a “severe critic of the theory of natural property rights in inventions”). 
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rectly, simply expounding at length on the inherent differences between 
the creative arts—appropriately the objects of property under a natural 
rights regime according to Macfie—and inventions—to which no claim of 
property could be made merely as a matter of moral right. As Macfie 
summarized the argument: 
Those things that belong to the province of patent right are in 
their nature capable of being independently discovered or origi-
nated, in the same identical form, by a plurality of persons . . . . 
It is otherwise with things that belong to the province of copy-
right . . . .132 
Advocates for the patent system, however, did not flock to the defense 
of the moral rights justification. Although others attributed to him the 
view,133 Webster did not defend the patent system on a pure moral rights 
basis. Webster’s paper on the “Patent Right” argued: 
[T]hat, of all acquired rights, that of an inventor to his own crea-
tion may be most truly called his own; his claims being that of 
the first occupant, the foundation of all property. But when he 
has given his invention to the world, the right to restrain others 
from copying it is a matter of municipal regulation:  in this coun-
try the grant of a patent is an act by grace of the crown, and it 
may be made on such conditions as the crown chooses.134  
This was a conventional approach distinguishing between undisclosed 
ideas, which could belong to the idea holder as a matter of natural right, 
and disclosed inventions, the grant of exclusive rights to which was a mat-
ter of “the grace of the crown,” and not of moral obligation.135 There has 
been little effort since Webster and Macfie’s day to revive a pure moral 
rights version of a natural rights justification for patents, particularly in the 
United States, in the face of the instrumental ambitions expressed in the 
U.S. Constitution.136 The abolitionist literature remains pertinent today as 
                                                                                                                         
 132. Robert Andrew Macfie, The Patent Question, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE NA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 818, 821 (George W. 
Hastings ed., 1864). 
 133. Ringworth stated, in Patent Law, TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 884, 890 (George W. Hastings ed., 1863), 
“I must enter my protest against the whole theory laid down. I differ from those who 
think, like Mr. Webster, that there is any inherent right on the part of the inventor.”  
 134. Id. at 885. 
 135. Id. 
 136. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the progress of . . . useful arts”). Cf. 
Adam Mossof, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History 1550-
1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001) (asserting that the natural rights justification played 
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an expression of doubt as to the force of moral rights justifications for pat-
ent systems. 
2. Incentive to Disclose 
Having discarded the moral rights justification for patents, the aboli-
tionists moved on to address instrumental justifications.137 One of the 
justifications discussed frequently during the course of the abolition 
debate was whether, and to what extent, the patent grant provided an 
incentive to disclose inventions. Webster, not surprisingly, employed the 
disclosure function in defense of the patent system: 
But as an inventor might, if he liked, keep his invention to him-
self, or practise it in secret, the object was to induce him to dis-
close it. If that system were done away with, then, instead of dis-
closure, we should have secret tribunals, of which we had now 
forgotten the history.138 
Macfie acknowledged the legitimacy of the disclosure function,139 but 
wondered whether the patent system was really inducing it. He speculated 
that many inventions, by their very nature, might be disclosed anyway 
upon legitimate commercialization,140 and, of course, disclosure might be 
                                                                                                                         
a more significant role in the early development of patent systems than contemporary 
scholars have acknowledged, and suggesting that natural rights arguments be accorded 
some respect in modern patent policy debates). 
 137. For a summary of instrumental justifications for the patent right as articulated in 
modern intellectual property theory, see, for example, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and 
the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1017, 1024-30, 1036-44 (1989). 
 138. NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1863, supra note 114, at 890. However, even Webster 
recognized the limitations of the incentive to disclose theory. Testifying before the House 
of Commons, he admitted that, “as a general rule, with reference to mechanical inven-
tions, it is quite impossible” to maintain such inventions in secrecy because “the result 
shows the means.” 2 MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS, supra note 98, at 335 (tran-
scribing extracts from Commons’ Committee’s Report of 1871, Mr. Webster’s Evi-
dence). Webster elaborated: 
The power of secrecy must be limited, I think, to chemical patents in 
this day. I do not think people can work much in closed rooms now-a-
days, and we should scarcely ever have such a case as that of Crumpton 
of Nottingham making lace in a closed room, and people getting up to 
the windows to find out the process. . . . 
Id.  
 139. MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98, at 23 (“The expediency . . . may be 
assumed of some means to stimulate the publishing or specifying of inventions.”). 
 140. This is one of several familiar objections to the incentive to disclose theory. See 
Machlup & Penrose, supra note 129, at 26 (cataloguing objections to the incentive to 
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extracted by less conventional means. In response to the question, 
“[w]ould the absence of Patents for inventions, in your judgment, have 
any effect in producing secret trades . . . ?,” Macfie quoted one commenta-
tor as answering, “I know this, that no trade can be kept secret long; a 
quart of ale will do wonders in that way.”141 Scholars continue to debate 
the extent to which patent systems induce disclosure, and it seems doubt-
ful that any general answer is likely to emerge. 
3. Incentive to Invent 
Webster articulated the now-familiar incentive theory under which the 
patent grant supplies an incentive to invent, or invest in research and de-
velopment, and an antidote to uncontrolled free-riding: 
Who would go to the expense of making elaborate machines, of 
which patterns could be taken by any other person the next day? 
Without the patent laws, all these inventions could not subsist, as 
men could not be found to go the expense of starting them.142 
The abolitionist response to this justification for the patent system was 
not especially satisfactory. Certainly, abolitionists would have experienced 
difficulty mustering a convincing argument that the patent system had re-
tarded the progress of innovation (or even reduced its rate of acceleration), 
given the unprecedented flowering of technology in the course of the In-
dustrial Revolution.143 So abolitionists generally conceded that the patent 
system had induced innovation, but argued either that the patent reward 
was disproportionate to the innovation induced, or that innovation was 
“overstimulated,” apparently meaning that resources were being devoted 
towards innovation in excess of some socially optimal level. One com-
mentator who adopted this latter view used the U.S. patent system as an 
example of the dangers of an overheated patent system: 
In all her arrangements, Nature provides for a due equilibrium of 
powers and tendencies . . . . But if . . . we give a factitious im-
pulse to the inventive faculty, we destroy the natural equilibrium 
of capacities, and foster a scheming, fanciful turn of mind, at the 
expense of thoroughness and a patient working out of sound 
                                                                                                                         
disclose theory raised in the course of the abolitionist movement). Modern scholars have 
voiced similar objections. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1028-29. 
 141. MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 56 (quoting Richard Roberts). 
 142. NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1863, supra note 114, at 890. 
 143. DUTTON, supra note 1, at 29 (noting that proponents of the patent system could 
argue that the recent decades had witnessed remarkable technological expansion, all dur-
ing a time when the patent system existed). 
 %(5.(/(<7(&+12/2*</$:-2851$/ 

ideas. This result has actually occurred in the United States, 
where the factitious value attached to invention has tended to 
produce an almost total sacrifice of solid workmanship to a 
flimsy ingenuity.144 
The arguments that the patent system offered disproportionate awards 
seemed to have a firmer foundation, but seemed only to prove that reform 
was needed, not abolition. For example, consider another Macfie argu-
ment:  
Mr. Webster . . . told us that the theory of the patent law is that a 
monopoly is given for a limited time, till the public are instructed 
in the new manufacture or new method of manufacture. But the 
misfortune is, that the patent retards the use by the public of 
whatever is patented . . . . We must remember that, now-a-days, 
the hindrance of fourteen years is very serious, so rapid is now 
the race of competition.145 
This argument is a familiar one today; economists have frequently as-
serted that the ex ante incentive structure of the patent system could be 
fine-tuned by optimizing the patent term—not by throwing out patents al-
together.146 Legislative efforts to revise the patent term, either in its abso-
lute length or by starting the term at the earliest effective filing date (or 
both), are legion, extending throughout the twentieth century, culminating 
in the adoption of the twenty-year term in the United States, in compliance 
with the TRIPs agreement.147 Modern scholars also recognize that the pat-
ent incentive can be optimized by careful attention to patent scope.148 
                                                                                                                         
 144. MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 119-20 (quoting from a pre-
sented paper of J. Stirling entitled “Patent Right”). 
 145. Is the Granting of Patents for Inventions Conducive to the Interests of Trade?, in 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
661, 665 (George W. Hastings ed. 1865) [hereinafter NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1865]. One 
wonders how Macfie would have felt about the rapidity of the twenty-first century “race 
of competition.”  
 146. See, e.g., Andrew W. Horowitz & Edwin L.-C. Rai, Patent Length and the Rate 
of Innovation, 37 INT’L ECON. REV. 785 (1996). 
 147. For a review of relevant legislation, see STAFF OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH 
CONG., EXPEDITING PATENT OFFICE PROCEDURE—A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 10-22 
(Comm. Print 1960) (Margaret M. Conway, author) (discussing dozens of legislative pro-
posals dating from 1875 to 1957 calling variously for term reductions or for terms of 20 
years measured from the filing date); see also PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE PATENT 
SYSTEM, REPORT TO THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPY-
RIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG., “TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF 
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Macfie also argued that the incentive structure provided by the patent 
system resulted in a profusion of patents. He offered what surely has now 
become a classic businessperson’s lament: 
In the manufacture with which I am connected—the sugar 
trade—there are somewhere like 300 or 400 patents. Now, how 
are we to know all these 400 patents? How are we to manage 
continually, in the natural process of making improvements in 
manufacture, to know which of these patents we are at any time 
conflicting with? So far as I know, we are not violating any pat-
ent; but really, if we are to be exceedingly earnest in the ques-
tion, probably we would require to have a highly paid clerk in 
London continually analysing the various patents; and every 
year, by the multiplication of patents, this difficulty is becoming 
more formidable.149 
One might well sympathize with Macfie on this point, but again the 
answer was reform, rather than abolition. Given the lack of substantive 
pre-grant examination, it is not surprising that the patent system of 
Macfie’s day experienced a fundamental patent quality problem.150 
                                                                                                                         
. . . USEFUL ARTS” IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 33 (1967) (recommending a 
20-year term measured from earliest effective filing date—Recommendation XVII). 
  Scholarly commentary on these and related proposals is voluminous. See, e.g., 
Arthur C. Fraser, Patent Law Reforms, 8 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 461, 468 (1925) (suggesting 
20-year term); W. Houston Kenyon, Jr., Sore Spots in the Patent System, 24 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 458, 471-75 (1942) (suggesting patent term measured from application date); Bert 
Russell, The Improvement of Our Patent System, 15 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 666 (1933) (sug-
gesting 20 year term); George H. Willits, Proposed Patent Legislation: Why It Is Needed, 
the Advantages of the Proposed Legislation and the Objections to It, 12 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 313, 392 (1930) (same). 
  Of course, this merely scratches the surface, leaving aside important issues such 
as term extensions for pharmaceuticals. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 155-56 (Supp. 2001). 
 148. To cite one common proposal, scholars have expressed mounting interest in 
more robust “fair use” or “experimental use” exceptions to infringement. See Mark D. 
Janis, Sustainable Agriculture, Patent Rights, and Plant Innovation, IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. 
STUD. n.51 (forthcoming 2002) (on file with author). 
       149. NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1865, supra note 145, at 666. Macfie was apparently 
fond of citing the 300-400 figure, including in testimony before the House of Commons. 
One such instance drew a response from Webster: “The Honourable Member for Leith 
[Macfie] made a notable admission, that out of 400 sugar patents, he was not aware of 
any one being obstructive.” 2 MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS, supra note 98, at 334 
(reproducing extracts from Commons’ Committee Report 1871, Mr. Webster’s Evi-
dence). 
 150. Webster thought as much. Id. at 664. This is all quite apart from the larger ques-
tion of whether a multiplicity of patents in a given art area is a bad thing at all for partici-
pants in that art area. 
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Macfie endorsed yet another argument about skewed patent incentives 
of interest to modern reformers. According to this argument, in the early 
days of British patent grants, patent “monopolies” were tolerated (i.e., 
deemed to create monopolies, but not of the “odious” variety) because 
craftsmen were so isolated, and communication so primitive, that govern-
ment needed to provide a stimulus to ensure the introduction of new tech-
nologies to the realm. There was then a “wide open field to invention” and 
a danger that innovations would be lost if not recorded by a centralized 
authority.151 Because those conditions were no longer present, the argu-
ment continued, the patent system was no longer necessary.152 
In one respect, this argument is consistent with what has now become 
a longstanding tradition, in which commentators of any given era proclaim 
that the patent system of their time was designed for the conditions of a 
previous age, and should therefore be reviled as anachronistic and scuttled 
or reformed. Learned Hand called the U.S. patent system of the 1930’s 
“archaic;”153 in the 1940’s, Frankfurter declared the system “obsolete;”154 
                                                                                                                         
 151. William Hawes, On the Economical Effects of the Patent Laws, in TRANSAC-
TIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 830, 833 
(George W. Hastings ed., 1864). 
 152. See also MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98 at 37 (presenting the argu-
ment that England was willing to tolerate exclusive patent rights in order to stimulate the 
development of new industries, but it was not foreseen that privileges would eventually 
be granted in large numbers in areas where industry (domestic) was already well estab-
lished).  
 153. Texas Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 87 F.2d 690, 693 (2d. Cir. 1937) (Hand, J.) 
(“Courts have always discouraged efforts to dress up [minor] advances . . . as invention; 
that discouragement was never more proper than at the present time, at least while the 
patent law remains as archaic as it is.”). 
  In a similar vein, a 1930s-era reform commission, addressing the question of 
whether a system of compulsory licensing should be introduced into U.S. patent law, 
observed: 
There has been enormous change in technique and commercial practice 
in the last hundred years. The patent system at its inception contem-
plated an individual inventor, given a monopoly for 17 years as a re-
ward and stimulant for invention, and to enable funds to be obtained 
from commercialization. This simple situation no longer obtains. What 
was originally a self- sufficient patent to an individual for 17 years has 
developed into a patent structure or assemblage of patents, giving a 
substantially permanent monopoly in an advancing art to an industry or 
a group of industries. The justification for the extension in a democratic 
country of an absolute monopoly to an invention, in lieu of maintaining 
it secret, no longer applies generally. 
Science Advisory Board, Report of the Committee on the Relation of the Patent System to 
the Stimulation of New Industries, reprinted in 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 94, 103 (1936). 
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in the mid-1950’s, the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and 
Copyrights reported that the patent system needed to be “adjusted to mod-
ern conditions;”155 in the later 1950’s, Professor Melman asserted that the 
patent system was so “obsolete” that it no longer was fulfilling its Consti-
tutional purpose to promote progress in the useful arts,156 sparking a spir-
ited response from the patent bar.157 
The obsolescence argument offered in the British patent controversy is 
also ironic when juxtaposed against modern arguments on international 
                                                                                                                         
 154. Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter noted: 
I have little doubt, in so far as I am entitled to express an opinion, that 
the vast transforming forces of technology have rendered obsolete 
much in our patent law. For all I know the basic assumption of our pat-
ent law may be false, and inventors and their financial backers do not 
need the incentive of a limited monopoly to stimulate invention. 
 155. REVIEW OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 71, at 1. As the report 
proceeded to explain: 
When the patent laws were first drawn, invention and discovery were 
almost exclusively the product of the efforts of individuals working 
alone. Today, invention and discovery are largely the work of research 
laboratories. . . . 
Id. 
 156. STAFF OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPY-
RIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., THE IMPACT OF THE PATENT 
SYSTEM ON RESEARCH 57 (Comm. Print 1958) (Seymour Melman, author). Melman rea-
soned that “changes in the ways of producing knowledge,” among other factors, resulted 
in the patent system having “lost the effectiveness that it may once have had as a way of 
promoting science and the useful arts.” Id.; see also id. at 62 (declaring that the patent 
system no longer served its Constitutional purpose). 
  Melman did not make clear whether he supported the outright abolition of the 
patent system, however. Certainly he seemed dismissive of the notion that any modest 
reforms could restore the usefulness of the patent system: 
The effort to operate a patent system formulated for the technological 
conditions of a century ago has proved to be increasingly awkward. 
The problems of patent-system operation, however, do not stem primar-
ily from the administrative shortcomings or from the absence of inge-
nuity among the able attorneys, judges, and Patent Office staffs who 
administer the system. Rather, they stem from the inability to apply the 
conceptions of a bygone era to the contemporary conditions under 
which technical knowledge is produced. 
Id. at 61-62. 
 157. Patent Law Association of Los Angeles, Our Patent System Works: A Reply to 
the Melman Report, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 295 (1960). The authors also questioned 
whether it was accurate to draw such a sharp distinction between modes of invention in 
the nineteenth century and the twentieth, discounting “the romanticized and largely 
fictionized [sic] picture of the struggling inventor of the past century, alone in his garret 
with his experiments.” Id. at 304. 
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patent policy. Macfie proposed that, while the patent system succeeded in 
stimulating progress in the early, developing British economy, it thwarted 
progress later, when Britain’s economy had a developed industrial base. 
Today, some scholars take precisely the opposite position:  that full-
fledged patent systems may benefit developed economies but may be 
counterproductive when transplanted into developing economies (e.g., to 
satisfy TRIPs obligations.158  
4. Reward Systems 
Perhaps of greatest interest to modern scholars is Macfie’s proposed 
alternative to the patent system:  a reward system administered by the 
government, paying a subsidy, sometimes in a predetermined amount, di-
rectly to the inventor rather than awarding property rights and allowing the 
inventor to collect license fees. According to Macfie, a reward system 
would be “on the whole, wise and fair,” as a substitute for “monopoly” 
patent rights; indeed, it would provide superior ex ante incentives because 
the reward, unlike royalties under a patent license, “is prompt and is sure; 
the bird is in the hand.”159  
Reward systems substitute the complexities of substantive patent ex-
amination with the complexities of calculating an optimal award amount. 
Perhaps the weakest aspect of Macfie’s reward argument was his failure to 
articulate a viable formula for calculating appropriate awards. Macfie 
gives little reassurance in providing simply that the reward payment would 
be calculated not in accordance with the amount that a patentee might ex-
tract by way of license fees if exclusive rights were granted, but rather by 
“what is fair, considering utility, cost of preliminary trials, originality, 
probability of others making the same discovery, &c.”160 
Macfie also offered an alternative proposal that combined notions of 
exclusive rights, compulsory licensing, and a reward system. Under this 
                                                                                                                         
 158. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPs—Natural Rights and a “Polite” Form of Eco-
nomic Imperialism, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415 (1996). 
 159. MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98, at 24-25. Macfie’s invocation of 
wisdom and fairness might suggest to some that his reward proposal was not based purely 
on utilitarian concerns. It is plausible to propose that Macfie would have agreed even 
with a normative version of Lockean labor theory (i.e., that an inventor should receive 
rewards for his labor), but would simply have argued that the patent system provided too 
generous a reward (i.e., a greater reward than the concerns of justice would have dic-
tated). See Machlup & Penrose, supra note 129, at 17-19 (describing views of various 
anti-patent advocates on the labor-reward theory); see generally Justin Hughes, The Phi-
losophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296-329 (1988) (thorough exploration 
of the Lockean labor-reward theory for various forms of intellectual property).  
 160. MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98, at 41. 
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proposal, a patentee would enjoy exclusive rights, subject to compulsory 
licensing, for a term of three years from grant, after which the government 
would undertake a “valuation” and subsequently pay the patentee in ac-
cord with the calculated value, after which any patent rights would cease. 
Under a further alternative, the government would have the option of un-
dertaking the valuation at a later time.161 
John Stuart Mill provided the standard economic argument in response 
to simple reward system proposals:  patent rights should be superior to a 
simple reward system because under a patent system, the market, through 
payment of license fees, determines the amount of the reward.162 Webster 
added that patented technology often did not come into general use until 
more than three years had passed, such that Macfie’s valuation scheme 
might not be practicable.163 
Curiously, Webster ultimately expressed tentative agreement with 
Macfie’s optional reward scheme, at least insofar as it relied upon the 
principle of compulsory licensing. Foreshadowing a debate that continues 
to the present day, Webster clearly favored the aggressive use of compul-
sory licensing schemes to curb potential abuses of patent rights.164 
Theoretical analysis as to the efficacy of reward systems continues in 
scholarly circles today.165 Indeed, given the definitive political failure of 
the abolitionist movement by the late 1870’s, Macfie might be pleasantly 
surprised at the extent to which his writings continue to inform modern 
scholarly debate. In their recent study of the economics of reward systems, 
Shavell and Ypersele cite Macfie’s work to illustrate the historical prece-
dent for reward system proposals and the basic outlines of those propos-
als.166 Shavell and Ypersele develop an economic model to test whether 
patent systems are superior, from a social welfare standpoint, to either 
pure reward systems or an optional system in which the innovator chooses 
between the patent grant and the reward grant. While they are unable to 
prove that pure reward systems are unambiguously superior to patent sys-
                                                                                                                         
 161. Macfie, The Patent Question, supra note 132, at 829. 
 162. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 129, at 20 (quoting Mill). Scholars have now 
elaborated on these simplified propositions. See text accompanying notes 166-171 infra. 
 163. NAPSS 1863 TRANSACTIONS, supra note 114, at 885. 
 164. See, e.g., NAPSS 1863 TRANSACTIONS, supra note 114, at 885; NAPSS 1865 
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 145, at 664. 
 165. See generally Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes (Soc. Sci. Researh 
Network, Law & Economics Working Paper Series), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/-
abstract=292079 (last visited Jan. 4. 2002); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property 
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 705-17 (2000) (critiquing 
prize proposals); Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 8. 
 166. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 8, at 526-27. 
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tems,167 they conclude that optional reward systems would outperform a 
patent system,168 even under circumstances where the government’s in-
formation relevant to calculation of the reward is relatively poor.169 
Others have pointed out practical and theoretical limitations of the 
Shavell and Ypersele model,170 but it is not my object to propose a resolu-
tion on the merits of this debate. It is remarkable, however, that the argu-
ments of a Victorian-era British sugar refiner retain relevance in twenty-
first century law and economics scholarship on patent theory. 
C. Harmonization or Abolition? Patents and the Interface with 
Free Trade 
While it may be that Robert Macfie held firm in his belief in the theo-
retical arguments he raised in support of abolishing the patent system, his 
motivation for pressing so aggressively for abolition seems to have sprung 
in no small part from pragmatic business considerations. Macfie was a 
domestic sugar refiner, an occupation that required an understanding of 
international competitiveness, even in the Victorian era. Of particular con-
cern to Macfie was the impact of British patent rights on competition in 
the trans-Atlantic sugar trade, especially competition between domestic 
sugar refiners and colonial producers in the British West Indies.171 Macfie 
generalized this narrow and self-serving claim into a variety of patent pro-
posals linking patent rights to free trade and exploring international patent 
law harmonization, as discussed in the subsections below.  
                                                                                                                         
 167. Id. at 530. They conclude that a patent system could be superior to a reward sys-
tem, because the patent system “effectively harnesses the private information of the inno-
vator about the value of an innovation,” but that the reward system could also be superior 
to the patent system, because the incentive to innovate is optimized (assuming that the 
reward equals the actual social surplus afforded by the invention) and there is no monop-
oly pricing, and hence no deadweight loss due to such pricing. Thus, no general argument 
favoring one system over the other can be made. 
 168. Id. at 530-31 (an optional reward system is “unambiguously” superior to patents 
because expected social welfare is improved when the innovator chooses the reward (e.g., 
by avoiding deadweight loss associated with monopoly pricing)). 
 169. Id. at 541. 
 170. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 165, at 17-25. Like Shavell and Ypersele, 
Abramowicz also makes reference to Macfie’s early arguments in support of a reward 
system. Id. at 4 n.14. 
 171. For background on the nineteenth century sugar trade, see generally R. W. 
BEACHEY, THE BRITISH WEST INDIES SUGAR INDUSTRY IN THE LATE 19TH CENTURY 40-
60 (1957) (describing the sugar trade and the Continental sugar bounty system); see also 
S.N. BROADBERRY, THE PRODUCTIVITY RACE: BRITISH MANUFACTURING IN INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE 1850-1990, 200 (1997) (discussing briefly the fall of the British 
sugar refining industry in the 1880s, in the context of the international competitiveness of 
British industry overall). 
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1. Free Trade 
Free trade principles172 probably formed the “main ideological influ-
ence” behind the abolitionist movement.173 Although anti-patent sentiment 
drew from a variety of motivations, it is clear that free trade was a recur-
ring theme, even finding its way into the title of one of Macfie’s numerous 
abolitionist tracts.174 
The free trade element of the abolitionist movement traces at 
least as far back as the debates over passage of the 1852 Act.175 
Patent reform proponents argued that the British patent right 
should extend not only across England, Scotland, and Ireland,176 
but also to British colonies. The principal advocates for this re-
form were domestic British sugar refiners, including Macfie, 
who took the view that domestic refiners were, in effect, “taxed” 
by the patent system, while West Indies refiners could operate 
free of it and compete in British domestic markets.177  
                                                                                                                         
 172. Concerning the free trade movement generally, see, for example, ANTHONY 
HOWE, FREE TRADE AND LIBERAL ENGLAND 1846-1946 chs. 3-5 (1997); Oliver Mac-
donagh, The Anti-Imperialism of Free Trade, 14 ECON. HIST. REV. 489, 490-93 (1962) 
(defining free trade by explaining its political context). On the rise of protectionism in 
Britain in the late 1870s, see, for example, BENJAMIN H. BROWN, THE TARIFF REFORM 
MOVEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN 1881-1895, at 9-28 (1943). 
 173. DUTTON, supra note 1, at 24. 
 174. See MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98. 
 175. See WEBSTER, supra note 16 (referring to the 1852 Act). 
 176. See WEBSTER, supra note 16, at 3 (reporting that some considered the 1835 Act 
insufficient for its failure to institute a patent that extended across England, Scotland, and 
Ireland). 
 177. See COULTER, supra note 14, at 59-60 (reporting the views of sugar refiners). 
Moreover, whereas one might expect that the domestic disadvantages of this “tax” could 
be alleviated by the imposition of import duties on foreign or colonial refiners, Great 
Britain had eliminated the sugar bounty system under the principle of free trade. Id. at 
169-71 (explaining briefly the bounty system). Macfie argued:  
Inventions, which are made the subject of patent in this country, very 
soon become known in other countries, and not many weeks elapse be-
fore other countries adopt what is detailed in the specifications of Great 
Britain. The result, therefore, is that while we British manufacturers 
stand with our arms folded, waiting till the expiration of the fourteen 
years, our rivals abroad do or may at once step in, use the inventions, 
and compete with us in our own markets; at any rate, they get too fre-
quently the use of inventions free, for which we alone pay, or are ex-
pected to pay, the inventors’ rewards. 
NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1865, supra note 145, at 666 (reporting comments of Macfie). 
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Ultimately, the sugar refiners failed:  the 1852 Act did not extend the 
patent right to British colonies.178 But Macfie had his argument, and was 
more than willing to advance it in the name of patent abolition.179 
In addition, from Macfie’s perspective, the free trade argument grew 
stronger in the course of the 1860’s because the disharmony among the 
patent laws of key European nations became more acute. In particular, 
Holland had abolished its patent system in 1869; Switzerland had no pat-
ent system; and France, Germany, and Belgium were all engaged in aboli-
tionist debates.180 The prospect of competition from Continental manufac-
turers operating free of any patent rights certainly would have added to 
Macfie’s sense of urgency to remove the “crying evil” brought about by 
the patent system.181 
Contemporary commentators disagreed on whether the anti-patent ar-
gument in fact reflected a proper interpretation of free trade principles. 
One of the major detractors was John Stuart Mill, who expressed “real 
alarm” that if the anti-patent movement succeeded, it would “enthrone free 
stealing under the prostituted name of free trade.”182 But aside from theo-
retical objections, Macfie’s free trade argument were met by pragmatic 
rejoinders. Webster supplied two. 
One of Webster’s rejoinders was an economic argument:  even if the 
domestic producer was forced to pay the “tax” in the form of patent li-
cense fees, the domestic producer received in exchange the benefit of the 
invention, which presumably was equal to or in excess of the license fee; 
otherwise, the producer would decline to adopt the patented technology.183 
                                                                                                                         
 178. Nor did this view prevail in debates that led to passage of the 1883 Act after the 
abolitionist movement had subsided. COULTER, supra note 14, at 167. 
 179. Id. at 72 (suggesting that although the 1852 reform effort failed, one result was 
the emergence of Robert Macfie as a leader in the burgeoning patent abolitionist move-
ment).  
 180. See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 1, at 29 (“The fact that Switzerland and Holland 
had abolished their patent systems in 1863 and 1869 gave the British movement an impe-
tus which it never previously had.”); COULTER, supra note 14, at 90. Macfie’s compila-
tions include numerous “extracts” from Dutch, French, German, and Belgian commenta-
tors and officials. See, e.g., MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 185 (relay-
ing official communication from Count Von Bismarck to the North German Parliament); 
id. at 164-180 (transcribing discussions in France); id. at 197-229 (transcribing discus-
sions in Holland). 
 181. MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98, at 33. 
 182. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 129, at 9 n.32 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, PRIN-
CIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 932 (1872)). 
 183. Macfie and Webster argue the point in 2 MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS, 
supra note 98 (reproducing extracts from Commons’ Committee’s Report of 1871, Mr. 
Webster’s Evidence): 
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Another rejoinder revealed that Macfie’s argument rested on a mistaken 
assumption as to the state of the law of infringement—although, in 
Macfie’s defense, the law had apparently changed in the course of the abo-
litionist debate, as reflected in the following exchange: 
Macfie:  [When England, Scotland, and Ireland had separate 
patent systems,] monopoly having been granted in 
England, but not in Scotland or Ireland, there was 
nothing then to prevent an English consumer, not-
withstanding the monopoly in England, from being 
supplied from Scotland and from Ireland, with arti-
cles made according to the invention in those two 
countries. . .[and] there was no restriction on impor-
tation into England of articles manufactured free of 
patents in the two sister countries, was there? 
Webster: [answering no, acknowledging a theoretical problem 
but doubting whether the problem ever in fact mani-
fested itself] 
Macfie:  Then under free trade, that which was formerly done 
as between Scotland and Ireland, on the one hand, 
and England, on the other, is being regularly done as 
between any foreign countries that have not patents 
and the whole of the British Islands, is it not? 
Webster: Yes; no doubt. 
Macfie:  So that an article patented in this country can be 
manufactured in Switzerland [where no patent sys-
                                                                                                                         
Macfie: [T]ake the sugar manufacture, a manufacture which is carried 
on upon the same principle, and for the same markets, in the 
colonies and in the United Kingdom; [the non-uniformity of 
patent rights] tended to make manufacturers of sugar in one 
part of the empire gain advantages on the one hand, or bear 
burdens on the other hand, that their competitors, also sub-
jects of the Queen, were not partakers of or liable to? 
Webster:  No doubt, theoretically that was so; but I take it that the 
advantage derived from the succession of improvements was 
such that that would disappear, and that sugar can be made at 
Liverpool or Leith quite as cheaply as anywhere in the colo-
nies by reason of the subsequent improvements. 
Id. at 339. 
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tem existed] or Holland [which had abolished its 
patent system], and sent to this country? 
Webster: Yes. 
Macfie:  But would the law prohibit the sale in this country of 
articles made in those two countries according to the 
principles of any patents existing in this country? 
Webster: Yes; that has been decided, within the last month, by 
the House of Lords. That is assuming that they were 
proved to be made according to the system that was 
patented in this country.184 
These exchanges suggest that Macfie’s effort to turn free trade princi-
ples to the cause of patent abolitionism may have failed on their own mer-
its. Regardless, events ensuing a short time after this exchange demon-
strated that Macfie made a strategic error when he linked the anti-patent 
movement to free trade. The British economy slid into depression, reviv-
ing protectionist impulses at the expense of free trade policies. By 1874, 
much had changed, including the British domestic political scene. Macfie 
lost his seat in the House of Commons, and the abolitionist movement lost 
its place in the domestic political agenda. 
Despite its failure, Macfie’s free trade argument was, in one respect, 
ahead of its time—it sought to link international trade policy with national 
patent policy. Macfie, representing a business concern based in an ad-
vanced economy and operating in an internationally-competitive market, 
argued on the basis of free-trade principles that the absence of patent sys-
tems in some countries (countries capable of participating in the export 
trade, but not necessarily having developed economies) gave those coun-
tries an advantage. Accordingly, he asserted that patents should be abol-
ished. Perhaps he would have thought it an ironic twist that in the late 
twentieth century, global business concerns in developing economies saw 
the absence of patent systems in some developing countries as antithetical 
                                                                                                                         
       184. Id. at 341-42 (reproducing extracts from Commons’ Committee’s Report of 
1871, Mr. Webster’s Evidence). Having apparently received the wrong answer, Macfie 
changed the issue, shifting to questions about the difficulty of proving that a product im-
ported into Britain had been manufactured overseas using a British patented process. The 
current U.S. patent statute reflects similar concerns. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (Supp. 2001) 
(liability for importation of products made by patented processes); id. § 295 (presumption 
that product was made by patented process).  
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to international trade, and suggested that patent systems meeting TRIPs 
minimum standards be established.  
2. International Patent Harmonization 
As noted above, Macfie perceived that variations among patent re-
gimes, from country to country, had the potential to impose unfair “taxes” 
on domestic industry in those countries where patent rights had to be re-
spected, and thus Macfie saw patent systems as obstructing “free trade.” 
While Macfie’s favored solution was to abolish patent systems where they 
existed, it was not his only proposal. Macfie appeared to recognize that if 
lack of uniformity among patent laws created the problem, harmonization 
(or unification) of patent laws provided one solution: 
How inconvenient and hurtful, to inventors and to the public, is 
the diversity of laws now prevailing! How great a facility to in-
ventors, if a Patent registered in one country were recognised in 
all others; and to both inventors and manufacturers, if a specifi-
cation published in one were made officially known in all.185 
Macfie proposed as much, although only as an alternative to outright 
abolition, and seemingly with considerably less vigor. Macfie’s proposal 
was a utopian one:  he called, as so many others have in succeeding years, 
for a patent of world-wide effect, apparently contemplating not merely 
harmonized national laws but a truly unified international system.186 Even 
then, Macfie recognized that it was probably “vain to hope that the coun-
tries of Europe and America, with their colonies, will speedily agree to an 
international system,”187 and so pressed his reward system as a more vi-
able alternative.188 
                                                                                                                         
 185. MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98, at 32. Macfie also reported on oth-
ers’ arguments for harmonization-related reforms—for example, Michel Chevalier’s ar-
gument that the scope of the prior art should extend worldwide. Chevalier asserted that 
the scope of prior art should reach “even to the antipodes,” explaining, with startling pre-
science, that in some far-flung “young communities” such as California, “[i]nventive 
genius is very active and very well-directed.” MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98, 
at 57 (translation of M. Michel Chevalier on the Law of Patents, taken from the introduc-
tion to the Rapports des Membres de la Section Francaise du Jury International sur 
l’ensemble de l’Exposition, 1862). . 
 186. NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1863, supra note 114, at 884 (reporting on Macfie’s 
paper, Patents Internationally Considered). 
 187. He probably had no idea how correct he was. Although interest in substantive 
patent law harmonization again seems to be on the rise, efforts to create a Community 
patent regime have again stalled. See Results of the Internal Market Council Brussels, 
Community Patent, MEMO/01/4510 (Dec. 12, 2001), at http://europa.eu.int/-
rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=MEMO/01/451|0|RAPID&lg=EN&d
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In another of many ironies, the patent abolitionist movement had very 
direct consequences for the international patent harmonization agenda. At 
the very time when “the controversy between patent and anti-patent forces 
throughout Europe was still bitter,”189 plans for the International Exposi-
tion at Vienna in 1873 generated pressure for international patent coopera-
tion, and ultimately led to the first international conference on patents, the 
Vienna Patent Congress of 1873. Some 158 participants from 13 countries, 
including the United States, Britain, and several countries from the Conti-
nent, gathered at the Congress.190 
Webster participated in the Vienna Congress, and was elected a Vice 
President (along with five others), a member of the Executive Committee, 
and, after the Congress, a member of an unofficial British committee 
formed to explore further cooperative efforts with the Executive Commit-
tee.191 Macfie submitted his views to the Congress by letter.192 Participants 
at the Congress endorsed patent protection in principle, and resolved to 
press ahead to create an international treaty on patents.193 The Congress 
also endorsed the principle of compulsory licensing.194 Webster, an advo-
cate of compulsory licensing despite his general support for the patent sys-
tem, defended this principle “warmly.”195 The influence of the patent 
abolitionist debate was clear.196 The patent abolitionist movement 
subsided, but the international patent movement took hold, maintaining 
discourse about many of the concerns promulgated by the patent 
abolitionists.197 Discussions at the Vienna Patent Congress led to further 
                                                                                                                         
isplay= (last visited Dec. 22, 2001) (reporting the most recent failure of the EU’s Council 
of Internal Market Ministers to reach agreement on proposals that would create a Com-
munity Patent). 
       188. NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1863, supra note 114, at 884. 
 189. EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYS-
TEM 46 (1951). 
 190. Id. (noting that despite the impressive attendance, the conference was not an 
official diplomatic conference). 
 191. COULTER, supra note 14, at 174-76. 
 192. 2 MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS, supra note 98, at 141-47 (reproducing 
extracts from Webster’s Report to the Royal Commission of the Vienna Universal Exhi-
bition, 1873). 
 193. PENROSE, supra note 189, at 46-48. 
 194. 2 MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS, supra note 98, at 147 (reproducing ex-
tracts from Webster’s Report to the Royal Commission of the Vienna Universal Exhibi-
tion, 1873). 
 195. Id.  
 196. PENROSE, supra note 189, at 47 (crediting the anti-patent movement with creat-
ing awareness of the potential abuses of the patent system, and thereby facilitating accep-
tance of the principle of compulsory licensing). 
 197. Coulter reports that both anti-patent and pro-patent forces approved of the agree-
ments made in Vienna; the anti-patent forces saw at least the prospect of eliminating the 
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Discussions at the Vienna Patent Congress led to further discussions in 
Paris; and in 1883, several nations signed the Paris Convention, regarded 
as the first international patent treaty.198 
IV. CONCLUSION:  PATENT LAW REFORM AND THE 
PATENT LAW REFORMATORY 
Despite the fundamental differences between the patent systems of 
nineteenth century Britain and those of the modern-day United States, 
many of the significant elements of the modern patent law reform agenda 
have antecedents in British patent abolitionism. The abolitionism literature 
therefore can, and should, inform modern patent reform debate in the 
United States. First, modern reform proponents who seek to invoke core 
arguments about the limitations of juries, or the efficacy of expert tribu-
nals, in patent litigation; the foundational justifications for systems of ex-
clusive property rights as compared to reward systems; or the notion that 
domestic patent policy interacts with considerations of global trade, can 
find the positions staked out with clarity in the abolitionism literature. 
Even arguments about Congressional diversion of PTO surplus fees have 
nineteenth century British counterparts.199  
                                                                                                                         
the disharmony in patent protection, easing their concerns over unfair advantages in in-
ternational trade. COULTER, supra note 14, at 176. 
 198. For an account of the origins of the Paris Convention, see STEPHEN P. LADAS, 1 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRO-
TECTION ch. 4 (1975); see also COULTER, supra note 14, at 176-80. 
     199. For an argument about fee diversion in the nineteenth century British patent 
system, see MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS, supra note 98, at 378, reproducing ex-
tracts from Commons’ Committee’s Report of 1871, Mr. Webster’s Evidence: 
[T]here is a surplus fund of £60,000 a year, which we call the Inven-
tors’ Fee Fund, and there is the accumulative fund of £750,000 more 
than that, accumulating at the rate of £50,000 or £60,000 a year, which 
I say is inventors’ money, and ought not to go into the Consolidated 
Fund. I say let the inventor have the benefit of it in the shape of a 
proper Patent Office . . . . 
  For a sample of recent discussions on the fee diversion issue in the U.S., see, for 
example, Union Chief Assails Diversion of PTO Fees, 61 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. (BNA) 600 (2001), noting that President Bush’s PTO budget proposal diverts a 
record $207 million and that H.R. 110 has been introduced in an attempt to curb annual 
fee diversion; New Bills Would Implement Madrid Protocol, Curb PTO Fee Diversion, 
61 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 420 (2001), discussing the introduction of 
H.R. 740 which would prevent future fee diversion; PTO Funding Falls Short of Goal 
Sought by Senate, 61 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 7 (2000), stating that 
H.R. 4942 withholds $161 million from PTO's estimated income and is diverting the fee 
income to other general programs; Panel Approves PTO Funding Bill with Fee Diver-
sion, 60 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 122 (2000), noting that the House 
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Second, those of us who dabble in U.S. patent law reform might take 
away from the abolitionism literature a general lesson in humility. As fre-
quently as we may invoke the exigencies of new technology and new eco-
nomic circumstances as motivation for patent law reform, many of our re-
form proposals return to decidedly old themes. In 1894, one commentator, 
writing in the Yale Law Journal, outlined the three major defects of the 
then-existing U.S. patent system:  “[f]irst, that there is little reliance to be 
placed on the patent itself; second, that the time which it takes to carry on 
a suit to enforce any patent rights is great; and third, that the expense of 
such litigation is enormous.”200 According to the author, several reform 
measures ought to be taken in view of these complaints, including arriving 
at a satisfactory definition of the standard of “invention,” and incorporat-
ing an inter partes element to the ex parte examination system.201 
The Yale Law Journal paper could have been written at nearly any 
point in the twentieth century. Among some serious scholars, its core ob-
servations would still ring true today. Indeed, in 2000, John Barton wrote 
a brief article in Science entitled, “Reforming the Patent System.”202 He 
advocated reform of the nonobviousness standard and weakening of the 
presumption of validity,203 and incorporation of a more robust inter partes 
reexamination scheme into U.S. law.204 
The Roosevelt administration in both the 1930s205 and 1940s,206 the 
Johnson administration in the 1960s,207 and the Bush administration in the 
                                                                                                                         
Judiciary Committee has approved H.R. 4034, which would end the yearly diversion of 
fees, but that such legislation is unlikely to be enacted. 
       200. Brewer, supra note 9, at 149. 
       201. The author also would have limited or even barred the use of expert testimony 
in patent litigation. Id. at 155 (recounting complaints that such experts might charge sums 
as outrageous as $50 per day). The author rejected suggestions that the term of the patent 
be severely limited, to ten years, as Congress was then considering. Id. at 150 (discussing 
the relevant legislation).  
       202. John H. Barton, Intellectual Property Rights: Reforming the Patent System, 287 
SCIENCE 1933 (2000). 
       203. Id. at 1933. 
       204. Id. at 1934. Professor Barton also suggested that “broad basic patents on 
fundamental research processes” might deter follow-on research, and could be subjected 
to a compulsory licensing regime. Id. at 1933-34. 
       205. Science Advisory Board, Report of the Committee on the Relation of the Patent 
System to the Stimulation of New Industries, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 94 (1936). The Sci-
ence Advisory Board formed the Committee in response to a request from the Secretary 
of Commerce “for a broad policy program for the stimulation of new industries in this 
country.” Id. at 94. Vannevar Bush, then Dean of Engineering at MIT, chaired the Com-
mittee, which was composed primarily of representatives from large corporations. Id. 
       206. THE NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION, 78th CONG., THE AMERICAN 
PATENT SYSTEM: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION (1943), 
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early 1990s208 all ordered special commissions to study patent law re-
form.209 The table below illustrates the common themes among reform 
commissions over the decades,210 reflecting a high level of congruence 
with the reform themes of the British patent abolitionist movement. 
 
 
Reform 
Proposal 
Committee on 
the Relation 
of the Patent 
System to the 
Stimulation of 
New Indus-
tries (1936) 
National Pat-
ent Planning 
Commission 
(1943) 
President’s 
Commission 
on the Patent 
System 
(1967) 
Advisory 
Commission 
on Patent 
Law 
Reform 
(1992) 
Reform of 
Obviousness 
Standard; 
Presumption of 
Validity Recommended Recommended   
Opposition/ 
Revocation  
Considered & 
rejected 
Recommended 
ex parte pre- 
and post-grant 
Recommended 
reform 
Pre-Grant 
Publication Recommended Not considered Recommended Recommended 
Single Appellate 
Patent Court Recommended Recommended  N/A 
                                                                                                                         
reprinted in 25 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 456 (1943). President Roosevelt established the 
Commission by executive order. 
       207. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, REPORT TO THE SENATE SUB-
COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
90TH CONG., “TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF . . . USEFUL ARTS” IN AN AGE OF EXPLOD-
ING TECHNOLOGY, S. Doc. No. 5 (Feb. 2, 1967). President Johnson established the Com-
mission in 1965. Id. at ii. The Commission included public members as well as represen-
tatives from the Departments of Commerce and Defense, and the Small Business Ad-
ministration and the National Science Foundation. Id. at iv. 
 208. THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SEC-
RETARY OF COMMERCE (1992). The Secretary of Commerce established the Advisory 
Commission in 1990. Members included lawyers, administrators from academia, and 
corporate executives. Id. at 5. The representative from the Association of University 
Technology Managers declined to sign the final report. Id. at iii.  
 209. In addition, Congress commissioned a series of studies on the patent system in 
the late 1950's. Several of those studies are cited in this article. See, e.g., supra notes 7, 
37, 123, 156 and accompanying text. 
 210. I have not included each reform suggested in each commission report. Where I 
have left a blank, the commission did not report any recommendations on the topic. 
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Patent Trial 
Courts 
Recommended 
the use of 
technical 
advisors  
Recommended 
the use of 
“Civil Com-
missioners” Recommended 
Compulsory 
Licensing 
Considered & 
rejected 
Considered 
w/o 
recommenda-
tion   
20-year Term  Recommended Recommended Recommended 
First-to-File   Recommended Recommended 
 
Obviously, these isolated examples of scholarship, and of reform com-
mission publications, do not alone support a broad claim that U.S. patent 
law reform over the past century has been an exercise in reiteration; but it 
seems worthwhile to ask a few hard questions about the content of the 
patent law reform agenda. Are these repeated themes of twentieth century 
U.S. patent law reform simply the inevitable themes of any patent law 
reform? Or have we become imprisoned in a kind of patent law reforma-
tory, in which patent law reform is little more than a repackaging of old 
debates? 
This last query presents an important set of questions about the nature 
of the patent law reform process generally. Reflecting on the patent aboli-
tionism literature and subsequent U.S. patent law reform efforts through 
1950, Machlup and Penrose conclude, rather tartly, that “little, if anything, 
has been said for or against the patent system in the twentieth century that 
was not said equally well in the nineteenth.”211 Perhaps some would hold 
this up as the ultimate moral of the patent abolitionism story:  abolitionism 
failed, patent law reform ever since then has stagnated, and a perpetual 
intellectual malaise has settled over the process. 
I am attracted to a more optimistic bottom line. Batzel argues that, in 
the face of radical “solutions” and theoretical arguments offered in the 
abolitionist debate, the patent system survived because reformers pushed 
“pragmatic administrative reforms”212 that strengthened the credibility of 
the patent system. The process became one of reciprocal adjustment at an 
incremental level; as the patent system reformed, attitudes about the patent 
system adjusted. “Custom and a growing sense of traditional practice” 
were “solidifying the place of patents in industrial England.”213 The his-
                                                                                                                         
 211. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 129, at 10. 
 212. Batzel, supra note 96, at 198. 
 213. Id. at 199. 
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tory of the British abolitionism movement should give pause to current 
U.S. patent policymakers. It should temper our enthusiasm for dramatic 
patent law reform through legislation, and encourage healthy skepticism 
about proposals that, when viewed in historical context, merely repackage 
century-old debates. 
 
 
